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Forecaster
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Contents Chapter 6

Part II: Who Gets to Stay

Build Homes People Can Reach

New homes can ease pressure beyond their first occupants, while direct affordability, preservation, and competent public building reach needs the market does not reliably meet.

By Kevin L. Michel12 minute read

The new building looks expensive because it is expensive.

There is a bright lobby, a terrace, a name that seems designed for people who do not check their balance before buying groceries. You walk past the leasing sign and wonder how this is supposed to help you. The advertised rent is beyond your reach. The person telling you to welcome it appears to have missed that detail.

Your question is reasonable. A home you cannot afford is not an immediate offer of shelter.

Yet the effect of a new building can extend beyond the people who move into it. Some may leave other homes vacant. Some may stop competing for older apartments. Additional choices can weaken the ability of existing owners to demand more. The benefits can reach people who will never enter the new lobby.

These are possibilities to investigate. They should not be recited as a reason to stop listening to someone whose rent is due.

A successful housing program needs to do two things at once: increase the number of useful homes and make secure access possible for households the ordinary market leaves behind. Arguing over which obligation matters allows both to remain unfinished.

Ask what would happen without the building

A neighborhood can become more expensive during a construction boom. That observation alone does not show that construction caused the increase.

Builders often seek places where demand and rents are already rising. New employers, improving transport, a university expansion, or renewed interest in a district can attract both higher-income residents and development. If we see the cranes and the higher rents together, we still need to know what rents would have done without the added homes.

The reverse caution matters too. Rents might weaken while new buildings open because employment has fallen or many residents have left. Construction should not receive all the credit for changes produced by a different cause.

Good research tries to make a credible comparison. Brian Asquith, Evan Mast, and Davin Reed studied large new market-rate apartment buildings in low-income areas, comparing nearby rental outcomes with locations farther away or developed later. They found lower nearby rents relative to those comparisons, along with increased moves from low-income areas. Their evidence supports a local supply effect in the settings studied; it does not promise a particular reduction around every new building.1

One objection is that attractive new development can draw amenities and richer households, increasing demand for the surrounding area. That mechanism is plausible. It must be weighed against the homes added. A building can change both demand and supply, and the net effect is a question for evidence rather than a photograph of its lobby.

The practical conclusion is modest but important. Expensive new homes can reduce pressure on other homes. Their price at first occupancy does not prove that they help nobody else.

It also does not prove that they help enough.

How a move can open another door

Suppose a household moves from an older two-bedroom into a new apartment. The old apartment becomes available. Another household moves there, leaving its previous home. A chain of moves can spread the effect of new construction beyond the initial site.

The chain can also stop. A person may move out of a shared home while the other residents remain. A household may arrive from another region. An owner may keep a vacated property empty or change its use. An available unit may be beyond the budget of everyone waiting nearby. These possibilities shape how much additional choice reaches which people.

Evan Mast’s research followed address histories from new market-rate multifamily buildings through successive rounds of moves. The observed connections reached lower-income neighborhoods. The study also used simulations to assess implications for the broader market. The distinction matters: tracing an observed chain is descriptive, while the modeled effects depend on assumptions about moves that would have happened without the new construction.2

Research published in 2026 offers a close view of one Honolulu condominium tower. Limin Fang, Emi Kim, and Justin Tyndall traced moves associated with its market-rate and income-restricted homes. Both led to vacancies elsewhere, including less expensive homes. The restricted homes generated fewer secondary vacancies, but those vacancies were concentrated at lower price points. This is a detailed single-building study with incomplete address-history coverage, not an estimate of a citywide rent effect.3

Fewer vacancies do not necessarily mean less human benefit. A young adult leaving a crowded family home may free no entire apartment, yet gain privacy and independence while easing crowding for those who remain. A policy judged only by the length of its moving chains would miss that improvement.

We should ask both how the housing market changes and how people’s lives change. They are related questions with different measures.

The limits of waiting for homes to become cheaper

The word filtering can refer to more than one process. Moving chains can begin as soon as people occupy a new building. The gradual aging of the housing stock takes much longer. Both can change who occupies particular homes, but neither promises a smooth descent toward a rent everyone can afford.

A desirable older building may become more expensive as its location gains value. An owner may renovate it for a higher-income market. Another building may become cheaper because its condition deteriorates. Affordability achieved through mold, unreliable heat, or dangerous wiring is a failure of housing provision.

We should preserve the useful part of an older home’s lower cost while preventing the loss of its basic quality. That requires maintenance, targeted rehabilitation, and sometimes acquisition or a lasting affordability agreement. Waiting for a building to decay is no substitute for policy.

There is also a floor beneath the cost of providing decent shelter. Even after the land and original construction have been paid for, someone must cover insurance, utilities, maintenance, administration, and future replacement. A household with very little income may be unable to meet those costs at any reasonable market rent.

This is where arguments about supply sometimes become evasive. Lowering regional rents is valuable, but a smaller unaffordable bill remains unaffordable. A person living on an inadequate income needs assistance or a home whose payment is deliberately held within reach. They should not be told to wait for a chain of moves to solve a gap the chain may never bridge.

Geography and suitability matter as well. More studios will not automatically provide enough family homes. A building without accessible units may add little choice for a wheelchair user. Homes far from dependable transport can shift a saving on rent into a larger burden elsewhere. Counting units is necessary; knowing what those units allow people to do is necessary too.

Put the subsidy where the gap is

There are several ways to make a home affordable. A subsidy can help a household pay for an existing home. It can help finance construction. It can support lower rents in a publicly or nonprofit-owned building. It can preserve a useful property before its lower-cost homes disappear.

The right choice depends on the problem.

Where suitable homes are available but a household lacks income, rental assistance can work directly on that gap. Where suitable homes are scarce, assistance needs a supply response and help finding a willing, lawful provider. A benefit on paper is incomplete if the family cannot use it before the search period ends.

HUD’s randomized Family Options Study followed families recruited in emergency shelters. Offers of long-term housing subsidies produced large improvements in housing stability relative to usual care. That result concerns an intervention for homeless families in the participating communities, rather than every possible subsidy or population.4

The lesson is practical: providing durable purchasing support can address a problem that temporary encouragement cannot.

Construction subsidies have a different task. They can support homes with payments below the level needed to cover ordinary development costs. To evaluate them, ask who can enter, how the payment is set, how long the commitment lasts, and who will fund maintenance. A ribbon-cutting is the beginning of that obligation.

Affordability labels need translation. A home may be called affordable because its rent is tied to a stated income band, while remaining unaffordable to a household earning much less. Public reports should name the households served and the actual payment required. Broad labels can make moderate-income production sound as though it has solved the needs of people with almost no income.

The duration matters. A short affordability period purchases a temporary benefit. Permanent or very long-term arrangements require sound governance and continuing resources, but they can preserve the value of public investment for successive residents. We should compare those commitments explicitly rather than treat every subsidized unit as equivalent.

The work behind the promise to build

Public building deserves a place in the program. So do nonprofit and private construction. None should receive an exemption from the need to perform competently.

A public agency does not build a home merely by announcing a target. It needs control of suitable land, workable designs, procurement, financing, staff able to manage contracts, and a plan for operating the finished building. If any of these is missing, the target can become a queue of stalled projects.

Capacity grows through a continuing program of work. A stable pipeline helps agencies retain experienced staff and helps contractors plan. Reusing sound designs can save effort while still adapting to a site’s climate, access, and surroundings. Clear standards can reduce repeated negotiation over ordinary details. Independent review can catch an unrealistic budget before it becomes a half-built structure.

This is patient institutional work. It is less photogenic than an ambitious promise, and more useful.

Land requires particular attention. Publicly owned sites can support housing, but the land is not free in the economic sense. Using it for one purpose gives up other possible uses or revenue. That can be a good decision. The public should see the value contributed, the benefits secured, and the conditions attached.

Where public money helps a private or nonprofit partner build, agreements should specify delivery, affordability, maintenance, reporting, and remedies for failure. Where a public body owns the homes, residents still need a reliable way to challenge poor service. Ownership by the public should make accountability clearer, not leave tenants trapped between offices that refer them to one another.

Mixed-income developments can use revenue from higher-paying residents to support lower payments elsewhere. That approach has limits set by costs, rents, financing, and the number of households needing deep support. A funding plan should not depend on endlessly rising market rents to keep its affordable promise alive. A project meant to reduce insecurity should be tested against a less generous future.

The operating budget deserves the same attention as the construction budget. A cheap building can become expensive if its equipment fails early or its layout is difficult to maintain. A more durable choice can cost more today and save money later. Officials should publish the assumptions behind those decisions, including reserves for major repairs. Residents should have a voice in what the building needs, without being made responsible for rescuing an institution that was underfunded from the beginning. Deferred maintenance is a debt paid in deteriorating daily life before it finally appears on an official balance sheet.

Make construction easier without making work cheaper

The cost of a home can be attacked at several points. Not all savings are equally desirable.

Removing needless delay can reduce the money spent while land sits idle and borrowed funds accumulate charges. Allowing practical building forms can use a valuable site more efficiently. Coordinating utility connections can prevent a completed building from waiting uselessly for service. Reducing avoidable design changes can save both time and materials.

Paying construction workers badly is a different kind of saving. It asks one group of working people to subsidize another through lower wages or dangerous conditions. A durable building program needs trained tradespeople, safe sites, apprenticeships, and an industry capable of delivering good work repeatedly.

Training takes time. So do production methods that genuinely improve quality and speed. Factory-built components may help in suitable projects, but transport, site preparation, local requirements, financing, and installation still matter. Every promising technique should be judged by completed, usable homes and their lifetime performance, rather than promotional claims.

Finance can stop a project even after permission is secured. Higher borrowing costs, weaker expected rents, or uncertain funding can make a previously workable plan fail. Public financing tools can help worthwhile projects cross that gap, but support should be tied to a defined public benefit and realistic repayment or subsidy assumptions.

This is why building more cannot mean repeating one instruction louder. Sometimes the obstacle is permission. Sometimes it is infrastructure, labor capacity, land assembly, money, or a design that serves the wrong need. Competent government and competent builders identify the obstacle in front of them and do the work required to remove it.

Count the homes that become a life

A housing program should report more than permissions granted or money announced.

How many usable homes were completed? How many existing homes were lost? Which households can afford the new payments? Are the homes occupied, maintained, and within reach of work and daily needs? Has the region’s pressure on rents eased relative to a credible comparison? Are people facing the greatest need obtaining stable homes?

Costs also need fair comparisons. A project with larger family apartments, accessible features, or substantial site cleanup may cost more per home than a simple project of small units. That difference warrants examination, not an automatic verdict of waste. At the same time, social purpose cannot excuse unexplained overruns or contracts awarded without meaningful scrutiny. Compare similar work, disclose unusual requirements, investigate avoidable costs, and learn from the buildings that perform well. Public trust grows when people can see both what was purchased and why it cost what it did.

These questions prevent competing institutions from counting different kinds of partial progress as the same victory. A permit is progress toward a home. A completed apartment is progress toward occupancy. An occupied apartment with a rent its residents can sustain is progress toward security. We need to keep moving through the sequence.

Return to the expensive building. Its existence may help people beyond its first residents, and the evidence gives us reasons to take that possibility seriously. Welcome the additional choice where the project meets sound standards. Then ask what is being done for the household still outside the door.

A broad supply response can reduce scarcity. Direct assistance, preservation, and dedicated affordable homes can reach needs that remain. Building institutions able to deliver both is a demanding public task. It is also a task we can organize, fund, measure, and improve.

The goal is a place someone can actually live, at a cost that leaves room for the rest of life.

Footnotes

  1. Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast, and Davin Reed, “Local Effects of Large New Apartment Buildings in Low-Income Areas,” Review of Economics and Statistics 105(2), 2023, 359–375, DOI 10.1162/rest_a_01055. Local comparison design; neighborhood income does not establish every mover’s individual income. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/105/2/359/100977/Local-Effects-of-Large-New-Apartment-Buildings-in ↩

  2. Evan Mast, “JUE Insight: The effect of new market-rate housing construction on the low-income housing market,” Journal of Urban Economics 133, 2023, 103383, DOI 10.1016/j.jue.2021.103383. Address-history tracing plus a simulation model; descriptive chains and modeled counterfactual effects are distinct. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119021000656 ↩

  3. Limin Fang, Emi Kim, and Justin Tyndall, “The downmarket impact of new multifamily housing: Evidence from a Honolulu condo tower,” Real Estate Economics, first published April 25, 2026, DOI 10.1111/1540-6229.70049. Single-building case study; the March 15, 2026 author manuscript details incomplete data coverage and scaling assumptions. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1540-6229.70049 ; https://www.justintyndall.com/FangKimTyndall_Filtering.pdf ↩

  4. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Family Options Study: 3-Year Impacts of Housing and Services Interventions for Homeless Families, October 2016, executive summary and chapter 3. Random assignment to offers; comparisons here concern long-term subsidies versus usual care. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Family-Options-Study-Full-Report.pdf ↩