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Contents Chapter 2

Part I: What we are asking a home to do

The Price of Getting In

Understand how land, credit and leverage can raise the price of entry without creating a better home.

By Kevin L. Michel12 minute read

The kitchen needs work. The listing describes it as an opportunity.

There is a crack beside the back door, an old refrigerator, and a patch of garden that receives more shade than the photographs suggested. Still, the price is higher than the couple expected. They have toured newer, larger houses for less money farther away.

What are they being asked to buy?

A building, certainly. Also a piece of land, permission to use it in particular ways, and access to everything around it. The bus that arrives nearby. The school their child might attend. The shorter journey to work. The confidence that another buyer will value the location later.

A property bundles these things into one number. Arguments about housing become confused when we treat that number as though it were simply the cost of putting up walls.

The cost of construction matters enormously. So do the location and the rules determining what can be built there. So does the amount buyers can borrow. A well-paid city can still make its workers housing-poor if access to suitable locations is sufficiently constrained. Cheaper credit can help someone purchase a home while also allowing competing bidders to offer more for the same scarce homes.

We need to separate these mechanisms. Otherwise, almost any policy can be sold as an affordability policy, including one whose main effect is to let the next buyer take on a larger debt.

The house and the ground beneath it

A building wears out. Materials age. Water finds an opening. Systems that seemed modern become difficult to repair. Good maintenance slows deterioration and improvements can make a home more useful, but the structure does not keep itself young because an online estimate has risen.

Land in a desirable location behaves differently. You cannot manufacture another parcel at exactly the same address. You can, however, make it possible for more households to use a location by allowing more homes on it. You can improve transport so other locations become practical substitutes. You can provide schools, services and employment in places that have been neglected. Physical scarcity is real; the social meaning of a particular location is partly made.

This is why saying that they are not making any more land settles so little. We are continually making decisions about how much housing land may support and which places receive the investments that make life workable.

Consider a plot allowed to hold one house. Now consider the same plot allowed to hold four well-designed homes. The land has not multiplied. Its capacity to accommodate people has changed. The project may still be infeasible because of construction costs, access, financing or site conditions. Permission is necessary in this example, but permission does not lay the foundation.

The important point is that a legal limit can make physical space unavailable for a use it could otherwise support. When that happens across a city, it affects who gets to live there.

At the other extreme, removing every rule would not create a good housing system. Unsafe buildings, flooding, inaccessible entrances and inadequate drainage impose costs on residents and neighbors. A rule that prevents structural failure is doing different work from a rule that reserves a large area for households able to purchase large lots. Calling both regulation conceals the choice we need to make.

Ask each rule to explain its purpose in ordinary language. What harm does it prevent? Who receives the benefit? Could the same protection be achieved while allowing more people a home? Who pays for the restriction through higher costs or a longer journey?

A rule should survive those questions because it serves a defensible purpose, not because it has been printed on a map for a long time.

What a loan adds

Most people cannot buy a home with money already in an account. Credit lets a household pay over time for an asset it uses now. That can be valuable. Construction itself may also require finance before anyone moves in.

But a loan changes purchasing power before it changes the stock of homes. If many buyers can borrow more while the number of suitable properties barely responds, some of the extra purchasing power may be absorbed into higher bids. The buyer receives assistance, yet the seller can capture part of its value. The extent depends on market conditions and the design of the assistance; it is not a law that every buyer subsidy is wasted.

A program that helps excluded households compete may still be justified. We should ask whether it is accompanied by more homes, whether its benefit persists, and whether it encourages a household to assume risks it can poorly bear. A bigger approved loan is not automatically a larger freedom.

Here is an illustration, using deliberately chosen rates rather than a current market quotation. A $240,000 loan repaid over thirty years with fixed monthly payments has a principal-and-interest payment of about $1,012 at 3 percent interest. At 6 percent, the corresponding payment is about $1,439. Taxes, insurance, fees and maintenance are excluded from both figures.1

The home is identical. The loan principal is identical. The monthly claim on the household differs by about $427.

Someone who bought under the first set of conditions may sincerely remember that the purchase required sacrifice. Someone confronting the second may make comparable sacrifices and still fail to reach the same result. Memories of effort are not a complete account of the terms on which effort was exercised.

The opposite movement can also confuse us. Lower rates may reduce the payment on a given loan, while stronger bidding raises the sale price. A household can benefit from the rate change and lose some of that benefit to the price response. To judge affordability, look at the entire arrangement: price, down payment, loan terms, other costs and income.

An argument focused on only one of these can make a difficult purchase sound easy.

The amplifier inside the deposit

Borrowing also changes the effect of a price movement on the owner’s equity.

Suppose an imaginary household buys a $300,000 home with $60,000 of its own money and a $240,000 loan. For this example, hold the debt constant and set aside transaction costs, taxes, interest, maintenance and any mortgage repayment. Initial equity is $60,000.

If the property’s value rises by 10 percent to $330,000, equity becomes $90,000. The property’s price rose by a tenth; equity rose by half.

If the property’s value falls by 10 percent to $270,000, equity becomes $30,000. Half the initial equity has disappeared on paper.

Neither result is a complete investment return because we deliberately excluded costs and cash flows. Both reveal the amplifier. A mortgage leaves the household’s equity exposed to changes in the value of a much larger asset.

Three hypothetical scenarios hold debt constant at $240,000. After a 10 percent price fall, a $270,000 home has $30,000 equity, down 50 percent. At the starting point, a $300,000 home has $60,000 equity. After a 10 percent price rise, a $330,000 home has $90,000 equity, up 50 percent. Costs, repayments and taxes are excluded. Equity changes are not net investment returns.

Scroll sideways to see all columns. Keyboard: focus the table and use the left and right arrow keys.

Text equivalent: The equity amplifier
Part of the figureMeaning
BookA Home Is Not a Jackpot
CalculationHome value minus debt equals equity.
Price falls 10%Home value $270,000. Minus debt $240,000. Equals equity $30,000. Down 50%.
Starting pointHome value $300,000. Minus debt $240,000. Equals equity $60,000. Starting equity.
Price rises 10%Home value $330,000. Minus debt $240,000. Equals equity $90,000. Up 50%.
ReminderIllustrative values. Debt held constant. Costs, repayments and taxes excluded. Equity changes are not net investment returns.
How to read the diagramEqual-sized panels are alternative hypothetical scenarios, not a time sequence or proportional chart. Each states home value minus constant debt equals equity. The percentage change compares equity with its $60,000 starting value; it is not a net investment return.

Figure 1. The equity amplifier. Original hypothetical arithmetic: a $300,000 home, $240,000 constant debt and $60,000 starting equity. A 10 percent price rise produces $90,000 equity; a 10 percent fall leaves $30,000. Costs, repayments and taxes are excluded, so these are not investment returns.

This is one reason successful housing stories can become so persuasive. A modest percentage movement in the asset may create a striking gain relative to the deposit. The owner can describe that gain truthfully while a listener mistakes it for evidence of an easy, repeatable path.

The listener may enter with a smaller deposit, a larger payment relative to income, fewer reserves, or a need to move sooner. The same asset class can expose two people to very different risks.

A price fall does not mean every owner must sell immediately. A household that can meet its obligations and wishes to remain may continue to receive the same shelter. But life does not promise to coordinate unemployment, separation, illness or relocation with a favorable housing market. Equity and liquidity become especially important when a household cannot simply wait.

No public conversation about housing wealth should erase that possibility.

U.S. house prices have fallen over substantial periods. In its release for the fourth quarter of 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency reported that its national, seasonally adjusted purchase-only index was 8.2 percent below the fourth quarter of 2007. The index covered a particular enterprise-backed mortgage sample, not every property, and the figure is from that historical release.2 It is enough to refute the comforting fiction that national housing prices only move upward.

A home may be worth owning without that fiction.

The price of a replacement life

Imagine Daniel’s household again. Their property has appreciated. Their daughter suggests that they sell, enjoy the gain, and move somewhere smaller.

This may be a good possibility. It may also be much harder than the sentence makes it sound.

A suitable smaller home nearby might be scarce. Moving farther away may separate them from friends or a relative they help. The new place might have stairs that will become a problem. Transaction costs consume part of the gain. If a new mortgage is necessary, its terms matter. What looks like excess space from outside may include a room needed for care, paid work or a returning family member.

None of this establishes that every existing housing arrangement should remain unchanged. It establishes that paper wealth and usable options are different things.

There is a particular version of this difficulty when an owner holds a fixed-rate mortgage well below rates available for a replacement purchase. Selling can mean giving up a valuable loan as well as a house. FHFA researchers studying the U.S. rate increase of 2022–2024 found evidence that this mortgage-rate gap discouraged sales. Their working paper estimates the size of the effect using loan data and a model; it is not a claim that every household with a low rate is unable to move.3

Notice the irony. A financial arrangement that protects the current payment can make the next move more expensive. Stability in one dimension can reduce flexibility in another.

This is why housing policy needs several kinds of security. A protected payment is useful. So are enough suitable homes, workable rental options, accessible neighborhoods and savings that do not require selling a building. If all security is concentrated in one contract at one address, changing a life can become unnecessarily difficult.

A good system should help people fit their homes to their lives, rather than forcing their lives to fit the financing they happened to obtain.

When the asking price becomes an instruction

Prices communicate scarcity, willingness to pay and expectations. They also issue practical instructions.

To the worker, an unaffordable price says travel farther. To the young couple, it may say postpone living together or accept a smaller space. To the builder, a high prospective selling price may say this project is worth attempting. To the landowner, an expectation of future appreciation may say wait.

These responses can pull in different directions. High prices can encourage construction where building is feasible. They can also raise land acquisition costs. A prospect of generous returns does not ensure that a home will be delivered quickly, at an affordable rent, or in a form useful to the people with the greatest need.

This does not require a theory of universal malice. People respond to the terms available to them. A developer must obtain finance and cover costs. An investor compares opportunities. A local owner considers the possibility of selling later. A tenant weighs the cost of moving against the next increase.

The moral question is what happens when individually understandable responses add up to a collectively damaging result.

We do not solve that question by demanding that every participant ignore their interests. We change the available terms. Permit useful construction. Invest in the infrastructure it requires. Reduce rewards for leaving valuable capacity unused where an appropriate, enforceable policy can do so. Protect people from unsafe conditions. Create forms of ownership that keep some homes affordable across successive households. Make the provision of decent housing a viable activity.

These are design choices, not appeals for everyone to become unusually generous at the same time.

The distinction matters to anyone tired of being told that the housing crisis will end when the people involved finally become better people. Some conduct deserves sanction. Some incentives need redesign. Confusing the two leaves us with a great deal of anger and too few homes.

The question behind the grant

Consider a town offering assistance to first-time buyers. The announcement shows a couple holding keys. It is a good photograph. The couple may have received a real benefit.

The harder evaluation starts after the photograph. How many households were helped? Which households could meet the remaining requirements? Were additional homes produced? Did prices respond? Could the same public money support more lasting access through a different arrangement? What happens to the subsidy when the property is sold?

A grant that enables an excluded household to buy can be worthwhile even if it does not solve the market. It should be described at that scale. A project can build useful homes without transforming regional affordability. It should be evaluated honestly too.

What we should resist is the habit of calling every increase in purchasing power an increase in supply, every approved mortgage a success, and every larger sale price a social gain.

The task is to improve the terms on which people obtain shelter. Sometimes that means helping a particular household cross an immediate barrier. Sometimes it means changing the barrier itself. Often we need to do both, with attention to how they interact.

There is room for ambition here. We can imagine homes becoming more comfortable, more energy efficient, easier to maintain and better connected to daily life while their cost relative to income becomes less punishing. Improvements in human welfare need not be measured by how much harder the next purchase becomes.

That is the kind of progress worth organizing around.

Before we can organize well, however, we must examine who arrives at the market with a deposit, who arrives with debt, and who has been told that the difference is merely a matter of discipline. The price of getting in is only part of the story. The other part is what people are carrying when they reach the door.

Footnotes

  1. Original illustration calculated with the standard fully amortizing monthly-payment formula, using a $240,000 principal, 360 monthly payments and annual nominal interest rates of 3 and 6 percent divided by twelve. Rounded payments are $1,012 and $1,439. Rates are hypothetical comparison inputs, not current offers; no fees, insurance, taxes or other housing costs are included. ↩

  2. Federal Housing Finance Agency, House Price Index Report, Fourth Quarter 2008 / December 2008, released February 24, 2009. The 8.2 percent decline refers to the national seasonally adjusted purchase-only index from Q4 2007 to Q4 2008, using the release’s historical vintage and mortgages purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. It is not a forecast or an all-property census. ↩

  3. Ross M. Batzer, Jonah R. Coste, William M. Doerner and Michael J. Seiler, The Lock-In Effect of Rising Mortgage Rates, FHFA Working Paper 24-03, revised August 2024. The qualitative finding here refers to the study’s U.S. loan-data analysis through Q2 2024; aggregate counterfactual magnitudes depend on its model and are not reproduced. ↩