Bring it home.
It is an appealing instruction. The words contain a place we know, a journey ending, and the possibility that somebody will finally be responsible. After months of shortages or late deliveries, a local factory can look like a solid answer to a world of uncertain messages.
The appeal deserves respect. A community that has lost skilled work may want more than cheaper goods. A government may have sound reasons to protect access to an essential product. A business may be tired of waiting across an ocean for a part it could obtain nearby. Domestic production can create jobs, shorten some journeys and preserve knowledge worth keeping.
But before we applaud the instruction, we need to identify what is coming home.
The finished fan? Its assembly? The motor? The wire? The machinery that makes the wire? The skill to repair that machinery? A change in the address of the final factory can alter some dependencies while leaving others almost exactly where they were.
Imagine a new local fan plant. Its building is real. Workers arrive each morning. Finished fans leave with a domestic origin label under the applicable rules. The plant buys imported motors, switches and plastic parts. It has reduced the journey of the assembled product and created local work. It still depends on imported inputs.
That does not make the plant a fraud. Assembly can be useful work. It means that the claim of improved security has to name the risks the plant actually reduces. If the problem was slow delivery of bulky finished fans, the plant may help. If the problem was a shortage at the shared overseas switch maker, the new roof has not solved it.
A ribbon can be cut around a dependency without cutting the dependency itself.
Different ways to change the map
We use several words for moving work, and they should not be allowed to do one another’s jobs.
Reshoring generally means bringing production back to a home economy. Nearshoring moves it closer to the market or existing operations. Diversification spreads sourcing among alternatives. Some businesses seek suppliers in politically aligned countries, often called friend-shoring. These choices can overlap, but none guarantees the others.
A firm can move all production closer and become more concentrated. It can add suppliers far away and become less exposed to one country’s local disaster. It can buy from friendly governments while relying on the same specialized plant behind several suppliers. It can operate domestic factories in different regions, or domestic factories that all depend on one power system.
The label tells us the direction of a strategy. It does not tell us the result.
Suppose Lena’s distributor considers three arrangements. The first uses one established overseas assembler. The second uses two assemblers in different regions. The third uses the new domestic plant. Which is more resilient?
Ask what kind of disruption we mean. If one foreign factory catches fire, the second arrangement may provide an alternative. If a shared overseas input disappears, both assemblers may stop. If shipping capacity becomes scarce, the domestic plant may have an advantage for finished goods, provided its own imported parts are available. If a severe local storm affects the domestic plant and the retail market together, overseas production may help replenish the damaged area.
The answer changes with the event because resilience is a relationship between a system and what happens to it. It is not a permanent moral quality attached to a postal code.
This does not mean that analysis must become endless. A business can identify its important exposures, compare a few credible alternatives and choose. What it should avoid is replacing that work with a word that sounds reassuring in a presentation.
There is also a distinction between having an alternative and having enough of it. A second supplier capable of making one tenth of the usual order may protect a priority customer or a minimum service. It may not replace the whole first supplier. That partial protection can be worth buying, but it should be described honestly.
If the purpose is to keep essential operations running, a modest alternative may be enough. If the promise is that customers will notice no change at all, the capacity needed can be much larger. The first question should concern the service we want to preserve, not the number of factories we would like to announce.
Independence is not a head count
Two suppliers can offer valuable protection when the trouble that stops one is unlikely to stop the other. The phrase unlikely to stop the other contains most of the work.
Consider two sources of the same bearing. One is affected by a local equipment failure. The other has sound equipment, approved output and spare capacity. It may help. Now put both plants beside the same river with similar flood exposure. The second name still exists, but the relationship between the risks has changed.
Shared risks can be less visible than geography. Suppliers may depend on the same material processor, transport service, software system or financing arrangement. A disruption at the shared point can reach both. Two different addresses offer no protection against the failure they have in common.
The reverse is also worth noticing. Nearby firms may face different risks and have different capabilities. Distant firms may recover at different speeds because one has better maintenance, clearer records or a stronger balance sheet. We should not assume that distance is the only source of independence.
There is no need to invent precise probabilities for every supplier to learn something useful. A map can reveal that both alternatives use the same port or that the backup’s capacity is already committed. A conversation can establish that the second source has never made the approved version. A test order can reveal a problem before the emergency.
These discoveries may lead to an unglamorous choice: change one component, approve another material, reserve a small amount of capacity, or move some stock. Such changes can protect service more effectively than a grand relocation that leaves the critical dependency untouched.
And relocation itself is a project with risks. Tools must be moved or bought. New workers must learn. Output may be inconsistent during the transition. Customers still need goods while the old and new arrangements overlap. A business that removes the original source before the alternative can perform may create the very shortage it intended to prevent.
A sensible transition keeps enough of the old system working while the new one proves itself. That overlap can look inefficient if judged only by today’s duplicated expense. It can be the price of changing safely.
What a model can warn us about
The OECD’s 2025 Supply Chain Resilience Review modeled broad attempts to relocalize supply chains. In its scenarios, global trade fell by more than 18 percent and global real GDP by more than 5 percent. Resilience did not consistently improve; output volatility increased in more than half the economies modeled.1
These are scenario results, not forecasts of what will certainly happen or measurements of a particular factory moving. They challenge the claim that a general retreat from international production is a costless path to stability. They do not prove that every domestic investment is unwise.
The distinction is important because both sides of a policy argument can misuse the same study. One may ignore the cost of closing off useful trade. Another may wave an aggregate result at a carefully targeted project as though the model had inspected its machinery. Neither has done the local analysis.
A country considering support for one essential input needs to ask what the project would change, what it would cost, what alternatives exist, and how performance would be checked. A proposal to make almost everything domestically asks a much larger question about lost specialization, scale and access to foreign supplies. Evidence about one should inform the other without being treated as an exact substitute.
The WTO’s World Trade Report 2021 makes a related point: trade can transmit shocks and also provide ways to respond to them. Foreign supply can replace damaged domestic production; foreign demand can support firms when local demand falls. Diversification and predictable trade conditions can therefore contribute to resilience.2
Imagine that a storm damages local farms. Access to food from unaffected places can help. Imagine that a foreign outbreak disrupts an imported input. Local or other foreign alternatives may help. Neither event establishes that every economy should make every good. It establishes that options are valuable when the original source cannot serve the need.
The phrase global dependence often sounds like the diagnosis of a disease. Dependence can be dangerous, but it is also part of how people obtain goods and skills that no one community could efficiently produce alone. The better question is whether the dependence is understood, fairly governed and open to alternatives.
A household depends on electricians without wishing to become its own power station. It wants competent service, reasonable terms, enforceable duties and a plan when something breaks. Nations face a more complex version of that problem. Complete self-sufficiency is not the only form of agency available to them.
The country that cannot become every factory
A large economy can discuss domestic production as though its home market could support almost any industry. That is a poor default for a small island.
Saint Lucia’s official Economic and Social Review for 2024 reported preliminary merchandise imports of EC$2,602.0 million, valued to include cost, insurance and freight. Consumer goods accounted for EC$1,211.0 million, intermediate goods for EC$873.8 million and capital goods for EC$517.2 million. The categories show that imports supplied production and investment as well as household consumption.3
These are values, not weights or a measure of the share of all needs met from abroad. They do not tell us that a given proportion of food eaten was imported. They do tell us that the import story includes goods used to make other goods and equipment used to work.
Imagine a Saint Lucian repair shop importing a tool that lets it restore equipment locally. The import can increase local capability. Imagine a farmer importing a suitable pump. The same can be true. An imported machine is not necessarily an alternative to domestic production; it may be part of what makes domestic production possible.
The useful distinction is between imports that support a valued activity and imports that can sensibly be replaced under better conditions. Neither category is identified simply by looking at a foreign label.
Small markets face practical limits. A factory has fixed costs before its first sale. Specialized equipment needs enough work to justify its use. Skilled people need opportunities to practice. A business making a component for one small domestic industry may need export customers to reach a viable scale. Telling it to become self-sufficient while closing its access to outside markets could remove the very demand that would let it survive.
UNCTAD’s work on small island developing states describes constraints involving remoteness, shipping connectivity, transport costs and exposure to disruption. Its point is not that every island faces the same circumstances. It is that geography and network position can make access to dependable transport an unusually important part of development.4
An island can be near another island on a map and poorly connected by scheduled freight. A route may pass through a larger hub. A short straight-line distance does not guarantee a short delivery time. Conversely, a farther supplier with frequent, reliable service may be easier to use than a closer one with infrequent sailings.
That makes the policy menu more varied than bring everything home. It may include maintaining a sound port, improving customs processes, supporting storage for essential goods, developing repair skills, sharing selected reserves with neighbors, and helping local producers obtain inputs and reach customers. Which combination works needs local evidence, finance and competent institutions.
Regional cooperation can widen the effective market. Several countries may be able to sustain a service or specialized facility that one could not. The arrangement still needs clear responsibilities. Who pays? Who gets access during a shared emergency? How are goods moved if the usual route fails? A regional label does not answer these questions by itself.
Nor should self-reliance become a polite way of telling small countries that they must solve global transport or climate problems alone. Their room to adapt is affected by decisions made elsewhere, including the structure of shipping services and the resources available for infrastructure. Local effort matters. It does not cancel the duties of larger actors whose choices shape the conditions.
There is dignity in producing things well. There is also dignity in trading well, repairing well, governing well and ensuring that people can obtain what they need. An economy should not be judged by how successfully it imitates a large country’s industrial photograph.
The skill that crosses a border
Trade does more than move finished objects. It can create occasions to learn.
In a randomized experiment with rug producers in Egypt, David Atkin, Amit Khandelwal and Adam Osman studied access to export opportunities. They found improvements in product quality and evidence of learning among participating producers. The study’s detailed tests helped distinguish learning from merely being paid more to make a more demanding product.5
This was a particular industry, place and intervention. It does not promise that every export contract teaches useful skills. It does show why closing a relationship can cost more than the current order’s revenue.
A demanding customer may provide precise feedback, a new design or a reason to improve a process. A supplier may introduce a material that lets a local firm make a product it could not previously offer. An engineer working with foreign equipment may acquire skill that later supports local maintenance and production. These gains require conditions under which knowledge actually moves and people can use it.
There is evidence on the input side too. Research by Pinelopi Goldberg, Amit Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik and Petia Topalova linked India’s trade liberalization and access to new imported inputs with the expansion of domestic firms’ product range. Access to outside materials and components helped firms make more kinds of things at home.6
The political language of imports versus domestic industry misses this possibility. A domestic producer may be an importer. A good export sector may rely on reliable imports. Restricting a foreign input can protect one producer while raising costs for many local firms that use it.
Suppose a policy places a charge on imported motors to encourage a domestic motor plant. The plant may benefit. Local fan assemblers using those motors may face higher costs until a suitable domestic source exists at sufficient scale. Some may be able to adapt; others may lose customers. The policy should account for both sides rather than count the visible jobs at the supported plant and stop there.
This is a hypothetical mechanism, not a verdict on a specific tariff. Governments can reasonably pursue learning, strategic capacity or other public goals. The case becomes stronger when the goal is precise, the cost is visible, and the support is tied to evidence of progress. It becomes weaker when every new burden on other producers is called a necessary sacrifice without being counted.
A learning strategy also needs people who can carry the learning forward. Training that lasts only for a launch event is insufficient. Workers need actual practice. Managers need incentives to improve quality rather than meet a short-term output target by rejecting inconvenient evidence. Technical institutions, reliable utilities and access to finance can be as important as the factory building.
There is a temptation to treat knowledge as something purchased with a machine. The machine arrives with a manual. Competence arrives through people learning how it behaves, how it fails and how to make it useful in local conditions. That process can be supported. It cannot be skipped by declaring the country ready.
Making the part near the ship
The Rotterdam documentary visits RAMLAB, where metal parts can be built through a form of additive manufacturing. Instead of shaping the whole object only by traditional casting or cutting, the process deposits material to build it up. The attraction is obvious for some low-volume parts: the needed object might be produced closer to the place where it will be used.7
The Port of Rotterdam Authority independently reports that RAMLAB produced a 3D-printed, certified marine propeller in 2017. Certification matters in that sentence. A part intended to work on a vessel must do more than look like the drawing.8
This is a practical example of changing a dependency rather than pretending to abolish dependence. The finished part may not need to travel from a distant factory. The local process still needs suitable feedstock, equipment, skilled operators, a usable design, finishing work and the relevant testing or approval. A digital file can travel quickly; its physical execution still has conditions.
For selected spare parts, the trade can be attractive. Instead of storing every possible finished form, a workshop may keep more general materials and the capability to make a range of items. That can reduce one kind of inventory while increasing the importance of equipment availability, technical knowledge and quality control.
It will not suit every item. Some parts are better made in large batches by established methods. Some materials or shapes may be unsuitable for the available process. The cost of qualifying a replacement can outweigh the benefit for an inexpensive item. A production method that works for one certified propeller does not establish that any ship’s broken part can be printed before lunch.
The interesting development is the widening of the choice. A business may hold stock, wait for an established producer, repair an old part, redesign around a common component, or make a qualified replacement locally. The best option depends on the job and the time available.
Return to our fan. Making an entire appliance locally from imported parts might shorten final delivery. Keeping the knowledge and parts to repair an existing fan could avoid the need for a whole new shipment. Designing the next model so a common switch can be replaced safely could make both production and repair easier. These are different routes to the same service: a working appliance in the room.
A country focused only on the origin label of new goods may neglect the local skills that keep old goods useful. Repair is often less dramatic than manufacturing, but its effect on access can be immediate.
The factory and the promise
When a government supports a new plant, the public should know what it is buying.
Perhaps the aim is a reserve source of an essential input. Perhaps it is employment in a region with few alternatives. Perhaps the goal is to develop a skill that will support other industries. These purposes can overlap, but each needs a way to judge success.
A plant can create jobs and still fail to provide emergency supply. It can supply a strategic product while employing fewer people than expected. It can meet its production target while depending on imported equipment that nobody has planned to maintain. A photograph of the opening cannot distinguish these outcomes.
Suppose the public helps finance a plant on the promise that it will serve urgent domestic needs during a disruption. The agreement must address more than the building. Will capacity be kept available? Which products can be made? What inputs are needed? Who pays for test runs? What price and allocation rules apply in an emergency? Can the output legally and practically be delivered to the people it is meant to protect?
These questions should be answered within the actual legal framework, not improvised from a slogan when the shortage begins. Public support without a clear public return can become a subsidy to a private option that the public never gets to exercise.
There is a related danger in counting announced capacity as available capacity. A planned factory, a built factory, a qualified production line and a dependable supplier are different stages. Each may require years of work and further spending. Policy needs milestones that recognize those differences.
This is not an argument for waiting until every uncertainty has vanished. Investment always involves uncertainty. It is an argument for describing what has actually been achieved and what remains to be done. Citizens can support a serious long-term project without being told that a press release has already secured their future.
The same discipline belongs in a private firm’s decision. A supplier promising to expand next year is a future possibility. A supplier with approved output and available capacity today is a present option. A prudent buyer can work with both while keeping the distinction visible.
Leaving room to change again
A resilient sourcing strategy should allow revision.
The source that works well today may become less suitable. A new supplier may develop real capability. A port may improve. A political relationship may deteriorate. A product redesign may remove a difficult part. Demand may shrink enough that a dedicated local plant no longer makes sense, or grow enough that it becomes viable.
A decision that cannot be reconsidered without humiliation is a dangerous form of dependence. Governments and businesses can become attached to their own announcements. Once they have declared a project the answer, evidence of trouble starts to look like disloyalty. Then money is spent protecting the story rather than improving the service.
This is why a good policy includes review conditions before the outcome is known. What would count as progress? What would justify more support? What failure would lead to a change? How will affected workers and communities be protected if the plan has to be revised?
A worker who has trained for the new plant should not be treated as disposable because the original forecast was poor. A supplier encouraged to invest deserves clear commitments. A community asked to host infrastructure deserves honest information about benefits and burdens. Flexibility for the buyer should not mean permanent uncertainty for everybody else.
Dependable relationships and the ability to change are sometimes in tension. A buyer wants options; a supplier wants enough commitment to invest. The answer is not to demand total freedom for one side and total readiness from the other. It is to agree what each side is paying for and which changes require notice, compensation or a new bargain.
This brings the chapter back to the difference between a connection and a trap. A connection allows useful work and can be revised under understood terms. A trap leaves one party unable to protect itself without suffering a loss it has little power to avoid. The same cross-border relationship can look like opportunity from one end and a trap from the other.
We should examine that difference before claiming that geography alone has made a system secure.
Lena’s distributor finally chooses a mixed approach. Most ordinary demand will be met by an established source. A second qualified source will receive enough continuing work to remain a real option. Some common repair parts will be held nearby. The new domestic assembler remains under consideration, with a clearer account of which imported inputs it needs and what service it could improve.
This is an example, not a universal prescription. Its value is the method: identify the service, identify the failure, compare ways to preserve the service, and pay for the option actually chosen. The method can support local production, foreign production or a combination without requiring the conclusion in advance.
The world does not become safer merely because we draw fewer arrows across a map. It becomes more workable when the arrows represent relationships we understand, alternatives we can use and commitments that survive an inconvenient week.
The next question is who will pay to keep those commitments ready.
Sources and notes
Footnotes
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OECD, Supply Chain Resilience Review, 2025, and its resilience overview. The more-than-18% trade decline, more-than-5% real-GDP decline and volatility result concern broad modeled relocalization scenarios. They are not a forecast or a project appraisal of a named factory. ↩
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WTO, World Trade Report 2021: Economic Resilience and Trade. The report addresses both shock transmission and the role of alternative supplies and markets. Its descriptive cross-country relationships should not be read as a causal estimate for each proposed policy. ↩
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Government of Saint Lucia, Economic and Social Review 2024, printed p.92 and table 49, p.158. Figures are the report’s preliminary 2024 vintage, in Eastern Caribbean dollars, imports valued CIF. Later revisions are not mixed into the category breakdown. Consumer, intermediate and capital categories sum to EC$2,602.0 million. The local repair shop and farmer are illustrations, not reported businesses. ↩
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UNCTAD, Small Island Developing States: Maritime Transport in the Era of a Disruptive Pandemic, 2021; and Fernando Cantu-Bazaldua, Remote but Well Connected? Neighboring but Isolated? Measuring Remoteness in the Context of Small Island Developing States, UNCTAD Research Paper 67, May 2021. These supply the network-connectivity perspective; no uniform island transport-cost estimate is asserted. ↩
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David Atkin, Amit K. Khandelwal and Adam Osman, “Exporting and Firm Performance: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(2), 2017, 551–615; accessible author draft. The evidence concerns Egyptian rug producers receiving export opportunities, not a general treatment effect for all trade. ↩
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Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Amit Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik and Petia Topalova, “Imported Intermediate Inputs and Domestic Product Growth: Evidence from India”, working-paper version 2008; published in Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4), 2010, 1727–1767, doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1727. The fan-motor tariff discussion is a hypothetical mechanism, not a policy result estimated in that paper. ↩
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Free Documentary, Europe’s Biggest Port: The Port of Rotterdam — Giant Hubs, Episode 2, uploaded December 22, 2019, approximately 39:31–42:06. The book does not adopt the narration’s broad claims that printing is always cheaper or faster. ↩
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Port of Rotterdam Authority, “World premiere: first series of 3D-printed bollards in Rotterdam harbour”, 2021, for the account of RAMLAB’s 2017 certified marine propeller and the wire-arc process. The broader discussion of substitutes, repair and public-support conditions is the author’s analysis, not a claim that one project has solved all spare-part constraints. ↩