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Contents Chapter 9

Part III: Making power answer

How Ordinary People Become Difficult to Ignore

A worked campaign shows how shared grievances become evidence, a practical demand, legitimate leverage and an enforceable result. Organization must protect its members and answer to them.

By Kevin L. Michel12 minute read

Let us build something.

For much of this book we have followed decisions downward, toward the people who must live with them. Now we will work in the other direction. We will start with a problem, bring people together and ask what would make an institution change its behavior.

Use an imagined city where a contractor provides home support to adults who need help with daily life. Visits are sometimes rescheduled at short notice. Workers say the timetable leaves too little room for travel and that they are blamed when the route fails. People receiving support complain of uncertainty. Families fill gaps where they can.

The contractor says recruitment is difficult and the public contract is underfunded. The city says performance is acceptable under its measures. Workers and service users have reasons to doubt that conclusion, but they have been complaining separately.

No one begins with a complete picture. That is normal. Organization is partly a way of acquiring one.

First create a place where the facts can meet

The first meeting should be small enough for people to speak honestly. It might involve a worker representative, two people receiving the service, a family carer and someone with experience reading public contracts.

The group should not start by agreeing that it already knows every cause. It should distinguish what members have observed, what they suspect and what information would help. A missed visit is an event. An allegation that management deliberately caused it is a further claim requiring evidence.

Workers may fear retaliation. Service users may fear losing help. Those risks should shape the process from the beginning. Consent matters. Personal health information should not become campaign material because a compelling story would attract attention. Anonymous accounts can protect people, although they may require additional verification and cannot always support the same public claim as an attributable record.

The group can begin with information it is entitled to use: its own experiences, public contract documents, published performance reports and voluntarily shared records handled with care. It should seek relevant legal or union guidance before actions that could affect employment or confidentiality obligations.

A campaign that exposes its most vulnerable participants for the sake of momentum has already misunderstood power.

The immediate product is a short account of the problem with explicit limits. Perhaps the group can document a pattern of late changes among participating households, but cannot yet estimate the citywide rate. Say that. A modest claim supported well is more useful than a dramatic claim that collapses under examination.

Credibility is a resource. Spend it carefully.

Find the decision that can move

The group next maps the institutions involved. The contractor controls staffing and routes. The city controls payment, monitoring and future contract terms. An elected committee may oversee the budget. A regulator may have responsibilities for care quality. A union may represent some workers, while others lack representation.

This map should distinguish sympathy from authority. A politician who supports the campaign may not be able to alter the current contract alone. A manager who understands the problem may need approval from someone else. A regulator may address safety but have no power over the payment model.

The campaign needs a demand directed toward an institution that can act.

A useful initial demand might be an independently checked review of scheduling and travel assumptions, with workers and service users represented, followed by a funded plan to reduce avoidable last-minute changes. The group may also seek a clear procedure for reporting missed visits and a deadline for receiving a usable response.

These are examples of possible demands, not a universal template. The right demand depends on the evidence and authority actually available.

Specificity helps reveal disagreement. The contractor may agree that routes need more time but argue that the city must pay. The city may argue that the contractor’s own margins should cover the change. The group can then press both to disclose the relevant assumptions rather than allowing each to use the other as an excuse.

The problem has moved from a general complaint to a decision with an accountable owner.

Build a common interest without erasing differences

Workers and service users may initially distrust one another. A family waiting for help sees a missed visit. A worker sees an impossible route and an accusation. The campaign has to show how the organization of the service can place them in conflict while harming both.

This is not achieved by declaring that their interests are identical. They are not. Workers need decent pay, manageable workloads and predictable hours. Service users need reliable help at appropriate times. Families may prefer changes that are convenient for them but difficult for staff. Public officials must consider a budget serving many needs.

A common interest can still be substantial: a service that is staffed and scheduled realistically, with clear responsibilities when something goes wrong.

The group should make space for disagreements over the remedy. If a proposal improves reliability by requiring workers to provide unpaid availability, worker representatives should object. If a proposal improves predictability for staff by making essential support unusably rigid, service users should object. These objections can improve the design.

The coalition becomes stronger when people can see how its demand protects their specific interests, not merely when a leader says everyone belongs together.

This is the practical work of solidarity. It takes longer than a slogan and survives more than one.

Grow at the speed of trust

A campaign needs enough people to matter and enough structure to remain trustworthy as it grows.

New participants should understand the demand, the evidence, the risks and how decisions are made. They should know who speaks for the group and how that authority can be changed. Meetings need a purpose. Records should be clear. Tasks should be small enough that people with demanding lives can complete them.

A person who cannot attend every meeting may still contribute crucial knowledge or support. Organization should not quietly award all influence to those with the most spare time.

In the imagined campaign, one member might track public committee dates. Another might help people describe service failures without disclosing unnecessary private information. A worker representative might gather concerns through an appropriate protected channel. Someone else might translate a technical report into ordinary language.

These tasks create capacity. They also distribute it. If only one charismatic person understands the contract, handles the press and controls the contact list, the campaign has built its own fragile hierarchy.

Leadership is valuable. It should make other people more capable.

As the group grows, it should test whether its account still fits the evidence. New information may show that problems are concentrated in one route, one time period or one contractual requirement. That can narrow the demand. Narrowing a claim in response to evidence is progress, even when the initial story was more dramatic.

The goal is to solve the problem, not preserve the first explanation.

Ask before escalating

The campaign should present its evidence and demand through an appropriate route, with a reasonable request for a response. This creates an opportunity to resolve the matter and a record of what the institution was asked to address.

It may discover that officials welcome the information and lack a channel through which it previously reached them. It may encounter defensiveness. It may receive a polite acknowledgement followed by silence.

The response helps determine the next step. A credible offer should be examined on its merits. A vague promise should be translated into a date, a responsibility and a way to verify completion. A refusal should be understood clearly enough to challenge the reason given.

Escalation should have a purpose. Public testimony, lawful demonstrations, collective bargaining, complaints to appropriate bodies and electoral pressure can create costs for continued inaction. The suitable methods depend on legal protections, the institution and the risks participants are willing to accept.

Nobody should be pressured into a consequential action through a misleading assurance that there is no risk. Nobody’s private address, medical history or family should become a target because a campaign needs an enemy. Threats and harassment can injure people, divide supporters and distract from the decision that needs to change.

Nonviolent discipline is a moral commitment and a practical way of keeping the campaign’s purpose visible.

It is possible to be forceful without being reckless. A well-documented public challenge can be uncomfortable. A lawful collective action can impose real pressure. A movement need not become harmless in order to remain humane.

Leverage is a relationship

The city’s officials may care about service outcomes, public reputation, budget stability and the next election. The contractor may care about retaining the contract, recruiting workers and avoiding costly disputes. Members of the coalition may have access to some of these concerns and little influence over others.

The campaign should identify which forms of pressure connect to the decision. A widely shared video may create attention without changing the contract. A carefully prepared hearing before the body controlling renewal may matter more. A worker organization may have bargaining rights or other lawful options that a loose group of residents does not.

Leverage becomes more credible when the group can sustain it. A single meeting can be ignored if no one returns. A campaign with a calendar, shared responsibilities and a growing record is harder to dismiss.

Sustaining pressure does not mean demanding endless sacrifice. Members need rest, clear roles and reasons to believe their effort has a chance of affecting the result. The organization should periodically ask whether its strategy is working and whether the burdens are falling unfairly on a few people.

There may be times to pause, change the demand or pursue another institution. Persistence is not the same as repeating an ineffective action forever.

A strategy should be judged by what it can move, not by how exhausted it makes its supporters.

Negotiate a result people can recognize

Suppose the city and contractor agree to a review. That is an opening, not yet a result.

Who will conduct it? What information will be available? How will workers and service users participate? When will findings be published? Which decisions can follow? What happens if the review identifies a problem that requires money?

The campaign should answer these questions before announcing victory. It should also distinguish an immediate safeguard from a longer-term redesign. Some risks may require prompt action while a broader review proceeds.

A negotiated agreement might include a test of revised routing, a method for measuring reliability, a protected feedback channel and a public report after a defined period. If the test reveals that additional funding is needed, the city should have committed to a clear decision process rather than simply promising to consider the matter someday.

These details can sound small beside a demand for transformation. They are how a transformation gains a foothold in an institution.

Members should understand the compromise. What was won? What remains unresolved? Which demands were deferred, and why? A representative who conceals the price of an agreement weakens the group’s ability to judge the next one.

The coalition must remain the author of its mandate. Negotiators are responsible to it, even when they have developed friendly relationships with the people across the table.

The work after the photograph

An agreement can fail quietly. Staff change. A report is delayed. A temporary improvement fades when attention moves elsewhere. The campaign therefore needs a modest plan for verification.

The measures should reflect the original problem. If the issue was avoidable last-minute changes, counting meetings held will not tell members whether life has improved. If workers were punished for impossible routes, a new feedback form is insufficient unless using it becomes safe and consequential.

The group should compare the outcome with a clear starting point, while acknowledging changes in demand or other conditions. It should seek the experiences of people less likely to speak publicly. It should publish an honest account of both gains and remaining failures.

If the remedy works, say so. Organizations that cannot recognize improvement become difficult partners and unreliable narrators. If the remedy fails, identify the failure precisely and return to the institution responsible.

An organizing cycle has seven tasks: bring together people facing a shared harm; verify the evidence; let members authorize a demand and identify the decision-maker who can meet it; choose lawful, nonviolent leverage; negotiate a specific commitment; check enforcement; and report back. Members renew or change the mandate, including deciding to pause or stop. Steps can be revisited; an agreement or a victory is not guaranteed.

Scroll sideways to see all columns. Keyboard: focus the table and use the left and right arrow keys.

Text equivalent: Turn a shared harm into a demand
TaskAccountability test
1. Organize around shared harmBring together the people affected; hear differences and avoid treating a group as uniform.
2. VerifyCheck records, accounts and contrary evidence; protect people who supply information.
3. Authorize the demandMembers choose the demand and identify the decision-maker with power to meet it.
4. Choose leverageUse lawful, nonviolent pressure; assess risks and protections rather than assuming an action is protected.
5. Negotiate a commitmentSpecify who will do what, by when, and how it can be checked. A commitment may not be reached.
6. Verify enforcementCheck implementation and what follows if a promise is broken.
7. Report back and renew the mandateReturn to affected people; continue, revise, pause or stop.
CycleRevisit earlier tasks whenever evidence or conditions change. The cycle is a method of accountability, not an inevitable path to victory.

Figure 3. Organization needs evidence, a mandate and a way to check the result. Return to the people affected when circumstances change, a negotiation stalls or a promise fails.

There is power in a group that can distinguish progress from performance and refuses to confuse either with a permanent guarantee.

The aim is eventually to make the improved practice ordinary. A successful campaign should not need its founding members to attend every meeting for the rest of their lives. It should help create rules, capabilities and representative channels that survive them.

Losing without becoming less capable

The campaign may lose a vote. The city may decline to fund the change. The contractor may dispute the evidence. A lawful challenge may take longer than members can sustain.

A loss matters. People may continue to suffer, and effort may have been costly. It should not be covered with motivational language that pretends disappointment is secretly victory.

Yet the group can examine what remains. Does it have better evidence? More participants? A clearer understanding of authority? A public record that can shape the next procurement or election? Have members learned to negotiate and communicate? Is there another lawful route worth pursuing?

Sometimes the responsible answer is to stop or narrow the effort. People are entitled to protect their lives. Sometimes a revised strategy has a credible chance. The decision should be made openly, with those carrying the risks.

What should not survive is a demand for personal devotion to the campaign regardless of its purpose. An organization exists to serve people; people do not exist to maintain an organization’s sense of importance.

A democratic movement should be capable of ending an unsuccessful tactic without treating the decision as a failure of character.

A different kind of confidence

At the beginning of the imagined campaign, each person held a fragment. A missed visit. An impossible route. A clause in a contract. A public report that seemed inconsistent with experience.

Organization brought the fragments together. It did not guarantee success. It made a better account possible, created a demand and gave people a way to act on it without standing entirely alone.

This is a form of confidence more useful than certainty. It says we can learn enough to challenge a decision, build enough support to be heard and judge the result honestly.

The same process can be adapted to many settings, with different laws, institutions and risks. Its core is a relationship among evidence, a legitimate mandate and the capacity to keep an institution engaged until something changes or a clear stopping point is reached.

Ordinary people become difficult to ignore when their concerns cease to arrive as isolated moments of distress and begin to appear as a durable, informed presence.

That presence can be built. It deserves time, resources and respect.