

Beyond Fracture: Political Stability and Institutional Resilience in Israel through April 2028

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Assessment and evidence cutoff 7 October 2026

Independent research using public sources

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Executive summary

Israel is likely to retain functioning national institutions through 7 April 2028. The more immediate danger is a state that continues to operate while legal restraints weaken and protection becomes increasingly unequal. These outcomes can occur together. Financial resources and a functioning administration help a country survive; they do not establish that public power is accountable or that people can obtain protection when they need it.

The evidence supports this distinction. Courts have reversed electoral exclusions, reopened a blocked appointments process and struck down disputed measures. Yet implementation remains uneven. The latest reporting on conscription enforcement contains conflicting accounts of proactive arrests, while a documented attempt to implement a Palestinian family's court remedy was obstructed by violence. A judgment is an important event. Its public value depends on what follows. [2,9,10,25,40,41]

Our quantitative analysis adds four findings. First, the fall in Israel's foreign-exchange reserves in September was mainly attributed to valuation changes, so the monthly decline provides little support on its own for a financial-flight narrative. Second, the July Bank of Israel and IMF growth projections imply different recovery paths, but both describe continued output growth. Third, the religious-to-secular reserve-participation ratio increased between the initial mobilization period and 2025, even as both groups' participation fell. Fourth, recorded settler attacks rose 50.8% in January–August 2026 against the same months of 2025; associated displacement rose 115.8%, with that increase concentrated early in 2026. Civilian protection requires its own assessment. Published inputs and calculations appear in the appendix. [18,19,21,35,37]

This report assesses state capacity, enforceable legal constraint and civilian protection separately. It uses explicit event definitions, a dated implementation register and an evidence-to-judgment review. It does not estimate a numerical probability of civil war. The available aggregate series cannot identify such a probability, and adding them into a single score would disguise disagreements about what the score measures.

The principal judgments are that continued national functioning and recurrent West Bank settler violence are likely; further erosion of legal safeguards is a serious, credible possibility; and nationwide institutional disintegration is poorly supported by the reviewed evidence. Confidence is moderate in the continuity judgment and lower in assessments of rare, severe outcomes and the direction of institutional reform. The analysis states what would change each judgment rather than treating today's baseline as a promise about the next eighteen months.

The practical priority is to make remedies work. Over the next six months, responsible institutions should publish the implementation status of consequential legal decisions, improve access to protection and complaints, and make service obligations and household support transparent. These are proposed measures with identifiable owners and evaluation rules. Their effectiveness should be tested against completed remedies, service access and household outcomes.

The question and the contribution

This study asks how political contention could impair public authority in Israel, which developments would distinguish erosion from breakdown, and what peaceful measures could reduce foreseeable harm. Its horizon runs from 7 October 2026 to 7 April 2028. Reviews at six and twelve months should examine changes in implementation and outcomes, rather than simply repeat the opening judgment.

The election scheduled for 27 October 2026 is the nearest institutional test. Its administration, the resolution of challenges and the acceptance of lawful outcomes will provide evidence about the system's capacity to settle disagreements. A change of government would be compatible with resilience. The object of the assessment is the functioning and accountability of public authority, not the continuation of Benjamin Netanyahu's government. [1,2,8]

Three questions organize the analysis. Can public institutions continue to finance and deliver core functions? Can legal restraints bind powerful officials in practice? Can affected people obtain protection and usable remedies? Answers may diverge. A treasury can remain solvent while a court order goes unenforced. A court can decide a case correctly while access to the remedy remains blocked. A decline in public trust can accompany orderly political participation without producing an armed contest over the state.

The contribution is an applied framework and a documented assessment, supported by reproducible descriptive calculations. Its added value lies in linking a decision to implementation and then to the outcome for the affected population. This gives the report a narrower and more testable claim than a general narrative of mounting instability. It also identifies a practical research agenda: follow the fate of remedies, not merely the number of institutional confrontations.

Communities within Israel, East Jerusalem, the occupied West Bank and Gaza remain distinct analytical settings. External regional hostilities are a further source of pressure. Incidents in these settings are not pooled into a new count of Israeli internal civil war. The report addresses their connections through public decisions, civilian access, political legitimacy and fiscal burdens while preserving the population and territory to which each finding applies.

Definitions and analytical boundaries

Mass protest is collective political expression. Unrest may involve disorder or disruption. Political and communal violence involve attacks connected to public power or group identity. These categories do not become organized armed conflict merely because events are disturbing or lethal. Ordinary crime is not automatically assigned a political purpose.

UCDP's state-based armed-conflict definition requires a contested incompatibility over government or territory, armed force between two parties of which at least one is a government, and at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Its war-intensity category begins at 1,000. Those retrospective coding rules help prevent category mistakes; they are not causal tipping points or legal determinations. The new internal-war contingency considered here concerns an organized contest over Israeli national authority, separately from the existing Israel-Palestine conflict. [3]

State failure means broad and sustained impairment of core public authority and functions. Collapse is its more extreme disintegration. Rotberg's public-goods account helps identify what must fail, but its historically situated categories do not supply a calibrated forecast for Israel. Security-institution fragmentation requires persistent competing organizational authority; criticism, petitions and individual refusals are inadequate evidence on their own. Refusing an unlawful order is not equivalent to repudiating lawful common authority. [4,30]

The civil-war literature explains why grievance is insufficient to establish an insurgency forecast. Fearon and Laitin emphasize conditions that sustain insurgency; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch emphasize politically

relevant group inequalities. Together they direct attention to both capacity and unequal treatment. Neither licenses a mechanical transfer of a cross-country association into a probability for this case. [5,6]

What institutional research adds

Research on constitutional review helps explain why legal authority and effective constraint must be measured separately. Vanberg models the implementation problem and tests implications against German Constitutional Court decisions. A court may depend on public support and the visibility of evasion when other branches must implement its ruling. The relevant inference for this study is that transparency about implementation can matter alongside the formal power to issue decisions. The German findings do not provide an effect size for Israel. [44]

Graham and Svobik's US research examines whether partisan and policy preferences weaken voters' willingness to punish undemocratic conduct by favored candidates. It offers a reason to distinguish stated support for democracy from behavior that preserves procedures. It does not establish how Israeli voters will act, and it does not make polarization a predictor of civil war. The practical implication is to observe actual acceptance of lawful outcomes alongside attitudes. [45]

A debate between Little and Meng and Knutsen and colleagues sharpens the measurement problem. The former emphasize observable indicators and question the strength of some broad claims of democratic decline. The latter argue that narrow observable measures can miss essential dimensions of democracy and that measurement choices always require judgment. Read together, they support a transparent combination of institutional conduct, legal changes and rights-related outcomes. Continuing elections are evidence of electoral activity; their existence alone cannot establish the quality of participation or protection. [46,47]

This report therefore makes its judgments inspectable without pretending that every important outcome can be reduced to a count. The implementation register names the event, subsequent action and unresolved result. The quantitative sections retain their original units. The forecast rules explain what a later reviewer should look for.

Research design and standards of inference

The study is a targeted review with structured within-case comparisons. It draws on official economic releases, parliamentary and presidential records, survey reports, legal scholarship, court reporting and humanitarian monitoring. The expanded search covered evidence available by 7 October 2026, including releases published on that date. It sought evidence of correction as well as deterioration. Appendix A records the major search strands and access limits.

The evidence is evaluated in a sequence. A rule or formal decision establishes what an institution required. A subsequent record establishes whether responsible actors acted on it. Further evidence establishes whether the intended service, participation or protection actually reached the affected population. Completion at an earlier step is not assumed to prove completion at a later one. This approach allows a legal success and a protection failure to be recorded in the same case without contradiction.

Evidence of capacity includes actual fiscal and administrative activity. Evidence of legal constraint includes consequential decisions and compliance with them. Evidence of protection includes access, recurring harm and the delivery of remedies. Surveys measure respondents' assessments of institutions, and economic forecasts describe conditional projections. Each informs the argument through a specified route; none stands in for an unobserved outcome.

The selected implementation cases are analytically relevant examples, not a random sample of decisions. They cannot estimate the share of all judgments obeyed or identify a national noncompliance trend. The selection includes electoral participation, appointments, service obligations, media regulation and civilian protection because each tests a different part of the argument. Where original judgments could not be retrieved, that limitation is explicit.

Likelihood describes the direction of the forward assessment. In this report, *likely* means favored over non-occurrence; *unlikely* means non-occurrence is favored; *unranked possibility* means the evidence supports consideration but does not justify a reliable directional judgment. These labels do not imply calibrated numerical ranges. In particular, “unlikely” should not be read as “negligible.” Confidence describes the directness, consistency and completeness of the supporting evidence. A moderate judgment has several relevant sources but material gaps; a low-confidence judgment depends heavily on indirect evidence or conditions that are difficult to observe.

The forecasts are evaluated separately. A worsening protection outcome does not automatically change the state-continuity judgment. An implemented election ruling raises confidence in legal correction without cancelling evidence of harm elsewhere. No numerical weights are assigned across these dimensions.

All added quantitative results are descriptive transformations of published aggregates. They include differences in percentage points, relative changes, normalized growth paths and period-matched incident comparisons. No raw survey reanalysis, original polling, causal regression or conflict-risk model was conducted. Published sampling designs do not justify treating these aggregates as independent binomial samples; the report therefore does not manufacture significance tests or confidence intervals from percentages alone. Ward, Greenhill and Bakke’s warning about confusing explanatory fit with predictive performance remains applicable. [7]

Economic capacity and the limits of recovery

The current economic evidence weighs against an imminent inability to maintain public functions. August consumer prices were 1.5% above their level a year earlier, and the Bank of Israel reported broad unemployment of 3.2% among people aged 25–64 in July. The unemployment measure includes specified economic absences; it is not the all-age headline rate. Low annual inflation also leaves the accumulated price level and unequal purchasing power unresolved. [15,16]


What the September reserve decline means

Today’s reserve release updates an important input. Foreign-exchange reserves ended September 2026 at US\$236.998 billion, compared with US\$241.641 billion in August. The decline was US\$4.643 billion, or 1.92%, calculated from the two reported levels. The Bank attributed approximately US\$4.411 billion to revaluation, equivalent to 95.0% of the net decline. The Bank’s revaluation category includes its foreign-currency receipts and payments, so this component is not a pure market-price effect or a measure of investor withdrawals. Government foreign-exchange activity and other or offsetting items mean the reported components should not be forced into an exact identity. [17,35]

The finding narrows the interpretation of a potentially alarming headline. A decline in the dollar value of a portfolio does not by itself demonstrate that the state is running out of usable resources. Reserves also remain a central-bank external buffer, not money freely available to meet every budget claim. Their relevance is to resilience against external financial stress; domestic service delivery still depends on budgets and implementation.

Two credible forecasts and a meaningful difference

The Bank of Israel’s July forecast projects real GDP growth of 4.0% in 2026 and 5.5% in 2027. The IMF’s July assessment projects 3.5% and 4.4%. Normalizing each institution’s 2025 annual output level to 100 yields 109.72 for the Bank’s 2027 path and 108.05 for the IMF path. The separation is 1.67 *index points* after compounding, or about 1.54% of the IMF’s normalized level. This compares the implications of the published growth rates; it is not an uncertainty interval or a new estimate of actual output. [18,19]

Figure 1 Alternative published recovery paths

Annual real GDP indexed to each forecast's 2025 level of 100. July 2026 vintages. The lines connect annual values, not monthly observations. Sources [18,19]; calculations in Appendix B.

Both forecasts envisage recovery, with different strength. The Bank's path assumes reduced fighting intensity in Lebanon and no additional fighting with Iran, and still leaves output below its prewar trend by the end of 2027. Thus positive growth does not imply that accumulated losses have been recovered. The forecast horizon also stops before April 2028. The report carries its political assessment further, but does not invent an economic projection for those additional months. [18]

The IMF projects a central-government deficit of 5.3% of GDP and public debt of 70.1% in 2026. Its general-government deficit is a different measure. These figures should not be mixed with the Bank's budget definitions as though any gap were a measurement error. The IMF's recommendation to rely on revenue measures and spending efficiency reflects its judgment that civilian spending is already low. That matters for the distribution of adjustment costs. [19]

Table 1 Economic conditions and interpretation. Sources [15,16,18,19,20,35]. Observations, estimates and forecasts retain their original status.

Indicator	Latest observation or projection used	What it establishes
Consumer price inflation	August 2026 1.5% year on year	Recent price change; household affordability requires additional evidence
Broad unemployment ages 25–64	July 2026 3.2%	Tight labor market under a specified expanded definition
Foreign-exchange reserves	September 2026 US\$236.998 billion	External financial buffer; not a fiscal spending balance
Real GDP growth in 2027	BoI 5.5%; IMF 4.4%	Two conditional July projections
IMF public debt projection	2026 70.1% of GDP	A fiscal constraint to manage; not proof of insolvency
SIPRI military expenditure	2025 7.8% of GDP	Estimated military resource burden

SIPRI estimates that military expenditure fell 4.9% in real terms in 2025 while remaining 97% above 2022. The annual decline therefore coexists with a much larger resource commitment than before the war. The institutional question is how adjustment is distributed and whether essential services remain reliable. Aggregate growth can coexist with prolonged household strain. [20]


The economic analysis supports continued capacity more directly than it supports political accommodation. Financial buffers give authorities options, but do not determine which options they choose. Persistent service failures despite available resources would point toward allocation, governance or implementation problems. A broad inability to finance and deliver services would instead weaken the continuity judgment itself.

Unequal burdens and differentiated public trust

The distribution of reserve service

IDI's analysis of CBS Labor Force Survey responses permits a useful distinction between relative concentration and absolute participation. Among Jewish men aged 21–44, average-month participation fell between October–December 2023 and the full year 2025. The religious-to-secular ratio nevertheless rose from 1.36 to 2.53, while their absolute gap narrowed from 4.0 to 2.6 *percentage points*. The comparison contrasts an initial three-month mobilization period with a full year; it does not establish a change in total service days or the distribution of all reservists. [21]

Figure 2 Participation fell while the religious-to-secular ratio rose



Average-month reserve participation among Jewish men aged 21–44. October–December 2023 and full-year 2025 are different mobilization windows, not matched annual periods. Source [21]; arithmetic in Appendix B.

The survey identifies service through work-related responses, and does not fully capture people outside the labor market. It supplies an indicator of reserve participation among people represented by the survey. The Haredi within-group rate was 0.3% in 2025, while secular men remained the largest group by number. Group rates cannot establish individual motives, refusal or institutional cohesion. [21]

A credible settlement must address both obligations and the ability of households to sustain them. Public debate often reduces fairness to how many people serve. Duration, lost earnings, childcare, delayed education and access to support also matter. A policy that increases formal participation while leaving prolonged household disruption untouched may satisfy one metric and fail the families it is meant to help. These are reasons to measure implementation and costs directly, rather than infer them from group labels.

Recovery has not reached all workers equally


An IDI survey of people employed immediately before the war found that 33% reported lower household income than before it. The corresponding figures were 56% among Arab respondents and about 28% among Jewish respondents. Fieldwork ran from 22 December 2025 to 14 January 2026, with 1,193 respondents, before the subsequent 2026 conflict with Iran. These are retrospective worker-survey responses, not estimates for every Israeli household or causal effects isolated from other changes. [48]

The finding supplies a concrete bridge between macroeconomic capacity and distributional concern. Even when national output recovers, people who lost work or business income may remain exposed. The policy question is whether compensation, employment services and civilian provision reach those facing persistent loss. Repeated surveys with consistent populations, together with administrative take-up and waiting-time data, would make that question more answerable.

Trust varies by institution and population

The Israeli Democracy Index provides comparable published observations from its main May 2024 and May 2025 surveys. Total-sample trust increased by 6 percentage points for the IDF, 4.5 for the Supreme Court and 4 for the government, while police trust fell by 4 points. The level of trust in government remained low. These movements reject an undifferentiated claim that trust in every institution was collapsing. They do not establish how institutions behaved. [36,49]

Figure 3 Institutional trust moved in different directions



Total adult sample expressing trust in the main May 2024 and May 2025 surveys. Published rounded percentages; descriptive changes without newly estimated significance tests. Sources [36,49].

The 2025 figures also differ across populations. Reported trust in the IDF was 83.5% among Jewish respondents including the survey's "others" category and 33% among Arab respondents. For the Supreme Court, the figures were 42% and 40%. Institution-specific questions therefore reveal differences that a single cohesion score would conceal. The 2025 sample comprised 1,569 adults, with different interview modes across language groups. [36]

The September 2026 JPPI survey offers a more recent but different measure. Compared with September 2025, the share rating the preceding year poorly moved from 35% to 30% for the economy, 36% to 37% for security, and 50% to 52% for society. Its 2026 fieldwork involved 869 respondents on 1–3 September. Small changes are reported descriptively. They cannot be joined to the IDI trust series as though the questions and samples were identical. [24]

The political implication is specific. Support for one institution may persist while dissatisfaction with another deepens. Electoral disagreement can remain compatible with shared procedures. What would materially change the assessment is evidence that authorities prevent opponents from using those procedures or that binding outcomes cease to govern official conduct. Public attitudes help identify where legitimacy is contested; they do not settle that question.

Reuters' reporting of increased recorded PTSD cases supports accessible treatment and family support. Administrative counts also reflect recognition and access to care. There is no basis here for treating trauma as a predictor of political violence. Similarly, the existence of civilian firearm licensing requirements establishes a regulatory framework, while the quality of oversight and aggregate safety outcomes require their own evidence. Neither issue can substitute for direct observation of organized political conduct. [22,23]

Judicial correction and the implementation gap

The most informative institutional record is mixed. Some disputes produced observable correction; others left implementation contested or moved decisive tests into the future. Table 2 separates these stages. Case identifiers improve traceability, although several court-hosted originals remained inaccessible. The report uses reproduced judgment text and independent reporting where specified, without presenting third-party summaries as official judgments.

Table 2 Selected implementation register. These seven episodes were chosen for relevance, not representativeness. No government-wide compliance percentage is calculated. References identify both underlying cases and the sources through which they were accessible.

Episode and legal event	Observed position by cutoff	Remaining test
Court appointments HCJ 79117-07-25; 31 May 2026	President's Office confirms 79 appointees took the oath on 15 September [10,39,50]	Vacancies, case processing and independence remain separate outcomes
Draft-arrest moratorium HCJ 41953-07-26; 3 September	Moratorium annulled after July injunction; October enforcement accounts differ [9,40,41,51]	Consistent lawful enforcement and comparable administrative reporting
Broadcast-regulator appointments HCJ 63904-03-26; 8 September	Three appointments annulled; remaining slate returned for vetting [13,52]	Complete administrative compliance record not obtained
Electoral exclusions AB 64311-09-26 and related cases; 2 October	Ra'am and Joint List bans reversed; Cassif eligible [2,53]	Actual voting, adjudication and acceptance remain prospective
Attorney General law; 15 July enactment	Enacted; commencement scheduled for 1 January 2027 [11,12,38]	Litigation and practical effects after commencement
Judicial-selection amendment; March 2025 enactment	New arrangement due with the next Knesset [32,54]	Future appointments and pending legal challenge
Palestinian family's return to Jalud; 6 September order reported by OCHA	Attempted return obstructed by violence later that month; remedy not achieved in the report [25]	Safe effective return and accountable protection

Appointments provide evidence of actual correction

The President's Office records 62 judges and 17 senior registrars taking the oath on 15 September. This is stronger evidence of an institutional output than an announcement that a committee intends to meet. Court reporting connects the appointments to proceedings challenging the prolonged blockage, while recording

unresolved vacancies. Justice Minister Yariv Levin defended his position in terms of representation and broad agreement. The episode shows that resistance and eventual correction can coexist; it does not establish that every dispute will end in the same way. [10,39,50]

Conscription exposes the difference between rule and practice

The 3 September judgment preserved the legal enforcement framework by invalidating the draft-arrest moratorium. Subsequent evidence complicates a simple compliance verdict. On 6 October, reporting on a Justice Ministry meeting summary described recent proactive enforcement as generally absent and recorded officials' explanations concerning competing priorities. Later that day, the IDF stated that it had made 15 proactive attempts in September, resulting in eight arrests. The underlying administrative records were not independently audited here. [9,40,41,51]

These accounts cannot support an absolute claim of zero enforcement. Nor does a small reported set of arrests establish equal or sustained implementation. The defensible finding is that judicial correction occurred while the scale and consistency of enforcement remained disputed. A useful next update would align reporting periods and distinguish border arrests, proactive attempts, completed arrests and subsequent legal outcomes. Counts from different stages should not be merged into a single performance number.

Electoral inclusion remains an ongoing test

The 2 October ruling restored eligibility for Ra'am and the Joint List unanimously; Cassif's eligibility was upheld by a separate 7–2 decision. Sami Abu Shehadeh withdrew his candidacy. The legal distinction between candidate disqualification and appeals against list disqualification matters, as does the distinction between permission to run and effective political participation. The ruling supplies evidence that judicial review constrained a consequential exclusion decision. It does not establish how the election will be conducted or how its outcome will be received. [2,8,53]

A post-election review should record certification, material challenges, authoritative decisions and participation in lawful government formation. Peaceful protest and appeals remain compatible with acceptance of the rules. Obstruction of the resulting lawful authority requires different evidence and a different assessment.

Changes to legal institutions require a substantive test

The Attorney General law was approved on 15 July by 65–51 and is scheduled to commence on 1 January 2027. The Knesset's account presents it as enabling government policy within law while preserving specified criminal-law independence. IDI's analysis argues that weakening binding legal advice and control over separate representation reduces safeguards. These are competing claims about institutional design; the effects were not yet observed at the cutoff. [11,12,38]

The judicial-selection amendment is also prospective, beginning with the next Knesset rather than simply on polling day. Its supporters argue for greater representation and agreement across political sides. The decisive questions are whether the resulting rules preserve independent judgment, permit vacancies to be filled, and leave meaningful remedies for abuses of power. Neither present-day appointments under existing rules nor the stated intentions of reformers settle those questions. [32,54]

Broadcast-regulator litigation illustrates a related problem. The September ruling addressed conflicts of interest and the vetting process. It did not establish witness tampering or a reward for testimony. A government's criticism of a ruling must be distinguished from refusal to implement its operative requirements. A complete record of implementation was not obtained. The July cabinet declaration and the cabinet secretary's contrary characterization therefore remain part of a documented dispute, not a substitute for that record. [13,33,52]

Mordechai and Lapid's legal analysis explains why negotiated accommodation can reduce confrontation while allowing safeguards to weaken. That mechanism is especially relevant here. An institutional bargain should be


assessed by what it makes enforceable and who can still obtain review. A quieter dispute may represent correction, postponement or a loss of constraint. The report treats these as distinct possibilities that subsequent conduct can help distinguish. [14]

Civilian protection across connected settings

A deterioration visible in comparable periods

OCHA's September 2026 data vintage records 1,623 settler attacks causing Palestinian casualties or property damage in January–August 2026, compared with 1,076 in the same months of 2025. The calculated increase is 50.8%. Recorded displacement associated with settler attacks and related access restrictions rose from 1,212 to 2,616, an increase of 115.8%. Both comparisons use the same revised source vintage and exclude other displacement causes. [37]

Figure 4 Recorded attacks and associated displacement increased



January–August comparisons from a single September 2026 OCHA vintage. Attacks and displaced people are different units and are plotted separately. West Bank reporting geography. Source [37]; monthly inputs and calculations in Appendix B.

These are documented incidents and displacement counts, not a probability sample or a verified longitudinal cohort. Access constraints and later verification can change totals. The recorded deterioration over the full comparison period is substantial. They do not measure organized conflict over Israeli national authority. [37]

The displacement increase was concentrated in the first three months. April–August displacement was 11.1% lower than in the same months of 2025, while recorded attacks remained 51.3% higher. The two measures therefore show different recent patterns. The full-period increase should not be described as a uniform month-by-month escalation.

A remedy can exist without delivering protection

OCHA's October report describes a Palestinian family from Jalud whose court-ordered return was obstructed by settler violence. Its account identifies a 6 September order, a return deadline and an unsuccessful attempted return later that month. The judicial text was not independently retrieved. On this evidence, the relevant sequence is an order, an implementation attempt and an unachieved protective outcome. It does not establish every actor's intention or a national rate of noncompliance. [25]

That sequence gives the paper's framework practical force. Counting the judgment as a successful remedy would omit the family's continuing displacement. Counting the whole episode as proof that courts no longer operate would omit the judicial intervention. The useful assessment preserves both observations and asks what prevented the remedy from reaching its beneficiary.

The ICRC's 29 September statement describes violence and restrictions affecting access to homes, health care, education and livelihoods. It identifies Israel's protection obligations as occupying power while recognizing its security concerns. The policy question therefore extends beyond the number of incidents: can people reach services, remain in or return to their homes, and obtain a timely response to threats and harm? [26]

Gaza and Israel require their own outcome records

Gaza's damaged services and constraints on humanitarian provision create immediate civilian needs. The reviewed OCHA reporting describes restrictions affecting food, water and health services. These observations concern Gaza and should not be relabeled as Israeli administrative collapse. They also cannot be added to the West Bank series to create a comparable incident trend. [25]

Within Israel, attacks on civilians and communal violence require their own records of location, attribution and context. The evidence assembled for this report does not provide a harmonized national series sufficient to forecast a widespread internal armed contest. This is an information limit, not a conclusion that all domestic protection is adequate. Existing Israeli and Palestinian civilian harms warrant prevention regardless of their implications for state survival.

External support and the pressures of regional conflict

International isolation has several dimensions: access to diplomacy, trade, finance, legal cooperation and assistance. Evidence from one should not be treated as proof of withdrawal in all the others. The newer material strengthens the report's ability to distinguish proposed restrictions from adopted measures.

The enacted US fiscal-year 2026 appropriations law provided at least US\$3.3 billion in military-financing grants for Israel and US\$500 million for cooperative programs. This directly establishes appropriated support. It does not establish disbursement of every dollar or guarantee later appropriations. The current assistance memorandum extends through fiscal year 2028, but remains a political commitment requiring congressional funding. The report does not treat it as a binding appropriation for future years. [27,42,55]

Public and congressional disagreement still matter. Pew recorded a rise in unfavorable views of the Israeli government from 43% in 2022 to 62% in May 2026. A July statement by 27 House members supported removing a proposed assistance line. These show political pressure, while the appropriations record shows institutional support. They describe different stages in a possible policy change. [28,34]

European pressure has also become more concrete but remains uneven. The EEAS confirmed a May 2026 package of individual sanctions while its July response described continuing Council discussion of other measures. An October European Parliamentary Research Service briefing reported national settlement-product restrictions alongside continuing EU divisions. Such measures differ from enactment of the Commission's September 2025 proposal to suspend broader trade concessions. The reviewed official sources did not establish that broader proposal's enactment by the cutoff. [29,43,56]

Regional escalation can change the assumptions behind every domestic assessment. It can interrupt recovery, extend household burdens and intensify disputes about accountability. It may also temporarily strengthen a sense of common purpose. The evidence here cannot establish a stable net effect on domestic cohesion. The appropriate response is to update the assumptions and observe the resulting conduct, rather than assign external war a fixed positive or negative coefficient in a political-risk score.

Forecasts and rules for reviewing them

The following assessments concern different outcomes and may all prove correct together. They are not shares of a common probability distribution. Continued state functioning can coexist with legal erosion, unequal protection and recurrent localized violence. The forecast horizon is the full interval from the evidence cutoff to 7 April 2028, with each checkpoint reporting both the preceding interval and the condition on that date.

What will count as a change

The present assessment does not compile national payment-arrears or service-delivery series for every core function. Its continuity judgment rests more directly on financial indicators and documented institutional outputs. The review protocol below states what subsequent assessments should collect.

For state continuity, the review should examine four core functions: national revenue and payment administration; operation of the central civilian executive; parliamentary activity or a legally authorized electoral transition; and adjudication by functioning courts. “Operating” requires evidence of substantive activity, not only the continued existence of an office. Unequal access is recorded separately in the protection assessment.

A *major interruption flag* is raised when at least two of these functions are broadly prevented from operating for 30 consecutive days. The review should classify the cause separately as internal authority conflict, external disruption, fiscal or administrative failure, or unresolved. Routine caretaker arrangements, an isolated service failure or a normal recess do not meet that rule. The 30-day window is an author-chosen review convention, not a validated threshold of state collapse. A review must also show whether using 14 or 60 days changes the classification. Generalized failure requires a separate substantive assessment of breadth, severity and persistence; the flag alone does not establish it.

Legal erosion is assessed against the powers and practical access available at the cutoff. The reviewer must identify the rule or practice that changed, the institution or population affected, its implementation and any effective remedy. A material reduction in independent review, binding legal restraint or political participation is recorded even if the administration remains efficient. Enactment without commencement is prospective. A change stayed or reversed before it takes effect does not count as an implemented loss.

Constitutional blockage concerns an unresolved authority dispute that prevents a necessary national decision, rather than disagreement over an ordinary policy choice. Record the decision prevented, responsible institutions, applicable deadline and duration. Use the same 30-day reporting convention, with the 14- and 60-day sensitivity check. A lawful appeal or stay changes the legal status of an obligation and must be recorded before judging it overdue.

Recurrent West Bank settler violence means qualifying documented incidents on distinct dates in at least two separate months within a six-month review interval. This is a transparent recurrence convention, not a measure of severity: one grave event can require immediate action. A sustained reduction in harm needs matched-period evidence and usable reporting access. Widespread internal armed conflict over Israeli national authority requires independently corroborated organization, repeated armed contest and sustained activity across more than an isolated locality. Existing conflict casualties are not reassigned to this outcome to satisfy a threshold.

For security-institution fragmentation, the test is a documented continuing organizational division over common lawful authority, persisting across repeated consequential decisions. Claims based only on speeches, individual disobedience or public distrust remain insufficient. The review should state what could be observed and what remains hidden; poor visibility warrants lower confidence rather than automatic reassurance.

Table 3 Separate forward judgments. Likelihood labels are directional judgments under the definitions above, not numerical probability bands. External escalation is a modifier of every row and has no fixed domestic effect assigned here.

Outcome through 7 April 2028	Likelihood	Confidence	Main basis and limit
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Outcome through 7 April 2028	Likelihood	Confidence	Main basis and limit
Continued operation of core national institutions without the defined major interruption	Likely	Moderate	Current financial capacity and concrete institutional outputs; future shocks remain uncertain
Further implemented weakening of legal safeguards	Unranked possibility	Low	Enacted prospective changes raise concern; judicial and political responses unresolved
Prolonged constitutional blockage	Unranked possibility	Low	Repeated authority disputes, alongside demonstrated correction
Recurrent West Bank settler attacks meeting the specified recurrence rule	Likely	Moderate	Recent incident record and matched-period deterioration; reporting limits remain
New widespread internal armed contest over Israeli national authority	Unlikely	Low	Political channels and capacity persist; no adequate predictive or cohesion dataset
Durable fragmentation of Israeli security institutions	Unlikely	Low	No established continuing organizational breach in reviewed evidence; observability is limited
Generalized Israeli state failure	Unlikely	Low	Broad administrative and financial functioning; no validated probability estimate

What the checkpoints must resolve

The *7 April 2027* review should establish what happened in the election, how material disputes were settled, and whether lawful outcomes were implemented. It should record the Attorney General law's actual legal status after its scheduled commencement, the applicable judicial-selection rules, and the first observable decisions under them. It should compare civilian harm over matched periods and update household and service evidence where comparable releases exist.

The *7 October 2027* review should examine whether early corrections endured. The central questions are recurring implementation failures, persistent vacancies or decision blockages, budget execution and service continuity. A legal reform should be evaluated through its observed effects, including whether affected people retain usable review and whether officials comply with resulting decisions.

The *7 April 2028* review should resolve each forecast using the frozen definitions, list any intervals that met the interruption rules, and report the condition at the endpoint separately. A crisis followed by recovery would appear in both records. The review should also identify changes in source coverage that make comparison unreliable. This prevents a favorable endpoint from erasing an earlier interruption or an isolated incident from being relabeled as eighteen months of failure.

Evidence supporting and challenging the judgments

A forecast becomes more useful when readers can see which evidence carries it. Table 4 identifies supporting observations, contrary evidence and the developments that would change the assessment. The entries are not equally strong or independent. An official source establishes its own recorded action or measurement; it does not automatically establish the absence of conduct outside its coverage.

Table 4 Evidence-to-judgment review. The protection finding is current and geographically specific; the continuity finding is a forward assessment of a different outcome.

Judgment	Strongest support	Main challenge	Evidence that would change it
National continuity is favored	Financial buffers, employment and completed institutional outputs [16,35,39]	Conditional recovery, costly conflict and authority disputes	Broad payment or service failures; the defined multi-function interruption
Legal correction remains possible	Reversed exclusions and completed appointments [2,39]	Prospective loss of restraints and disputed implementation [11,40,41]	Repeated implemented remedies strengthen it; sustained unremedied institutional refusal weakens it
Further legal erosion is credible	Enacted changes awaiting operation; mechanism identified in scholarship [11,14,32]	Litigation, electoral accountability and surviving review	Actual exercise of weakened safeguards, or effective reversal and replacement protections
Recorded West Bank harm was greater in January–August 2026 than in the same months of 2025	Matched-period attacks and displacement; failed remedy account [25,37]	Coverage, attribution and later revision of counts	Sustained matched-period reductions with independent access and completed remedies
Severe nationwide breakdown is disfavored	Core institutions still operate; no established rival national authority	Cohesion is poorly measured; rare outcomes can change quickly	Independently corroborated organizational division and broad functional loss

How dependent are the conclusions on favorable evidence

The baseline should survive reasonable changes in what evidence is admitted. Three qualitative sensitivity checks show its practical limits. These are source-withdrawal exercises, not statistical robustness tests.

First, remove the Bank of Israel’s more optimistic GDP projection. The IMF still projects recovery, while observed reserves and institutional activity remain. The continuity judgment loses some support for the strength of recovery but does not rely on one growth forecast. If actual fiscal and service performance deteriorate, that would be more consequential than the difference between the two July projections.

Second, count judicial outcomes only when a subsequent action is documented. The appointments retain weight because the oath ceremony is observed. Electoral eligibility is an operative legal change, but successful voting and outcome acceptance remain unobserved at the cutoff. The conscription and media cases receive less reassuring weight. This stricter reading supports uneven correction and keeps confidence in broader legal resilience limited.

Third, treat the absence of public evidence about security-institution fragmentation as unknown rather than reassuring. Continuing state functions still support the judgment against generalized failure. They provide weaker reassurance against organized internal conflict, which can occur while substantial state capacity survives. The latter remains a weakly supported directional assessment with low confidence. This is why the paper cannot responsibly turn “unlikely” into a small percentage or a guarantee.

The converse check is equally important. Removing all economic evidence would not erase documented civilian harm or failed protection. Removing a particular incident account would not erase the matched-period aggregate series. The separation of outcomes gives the analysis this useful property: one disputed observation cannot legitimately reverse judgments in every domain at once.

A practical agenda for peaceful prevention

The proposed measures focus on gaps revealed by the evidence. They do not assume that officials agree on the diagnosis, and they do not claim a measured effect on conflict risk. The UN–World Bank prevention literature supports attention to exclusion and credible institutions, but provides no Israel-specific effect size for this package. [31]

Make the implementation of legal decisions visible

The Ministry of Justice, court administration and relevant implementing agencies should establish a public record for consequential public-law decisions. An initial version could be published within 30 days of adopting the proposal and updated monthly. Each entry should state the operative obligation, any deadline or stay, the implementing body and documentary evidence of action. Where the agency disputes the coding, its explanation should appear beside the entry.

The first version should cover a manageable, explicitly defined set of electoral, appointment and civilian-remedy decisions. Expansion should follow a review of omissions and workload. Court orders and stays provide an existing legal structure; the new element is a consistent public account of implementation. Agencies would retain responsibility for their lawful actions, while the record would make delay and disagreement easier to identify.

A dashboard can itself become misleading if agencies close cases after completing paperwork while affected people remain excluded or displaced. It should therefore distinguish procedural completion from the intended outcome. Independent legal researchers and civil-society organizations should be able to submit documented corrections. Personal details should be withheld where disclosure could expose people seeking protection.

The evaluation should report the number of due operative obligations, unresolved cases, completed actions and elapsed time to implementation. It should publish the coding rules and reasons for exclusions. A completion percentage is appropriate only for that defined register, with lawful stays and superseded obligations handled transparently. It would still not represent all government compliance.

Track whether civilian remedies restore access

Authorities responsible for protection and enforcement should pair the legal record with case follow-up on access to homes, health care, schooling and livelihoods. Where a remedy requires safe access, responsible bodies should document whether access was actually restored and sustained. Humanitarian monitors and legal representatives can provide an independent account of outcomes without replacing official responsibility.

An initial 90-day review should identify unresolved court-backed civilian remedies within a published scope, the reason for each delay and the institution responsible for the next lawful step. The review should also record whether complainants can safely use the process. Success means an effective remedy or an independently reviewable lawful resolution, rather than a reduction in complaints alone.

Political resistance and conflicting accounts of incidents are real obstacles. A credible process must preserve evidence, allow responses, avoid prejudging criminal responsibility and remain usable across communities. Aggregate publication of time to remedy, recurrence after intervention and verified service access would help distinguish genuine improvement from diminished reporting. These are proposed evaluation measures; the report has not tested their causal impact.

Reduce household disruption while clarifying obligations

The Knesset and responsible civilian ministries should publish a clear implementation account of service obligations, lawful exemptions and transitional arrangements. The finance and labor authorities should assess the household consequences alongside existing compensation and employment support. A first joint review within

six months should examine repeated absences, payment delays, childcare burdens, employment continuity and barriers to assistance.

The reserve-service calculations show why a single participation target would be inadequate. Participation rates can fall while the ratio between groups rises. Fairness therefore requires an account of who carries recurring costs and who can obtain relief. Published aggregate indicators should not be used to assign motives or blame to individuals.

The practical trade-off is between a credible transition and indefinite exceptions that undermine confidence in equal treatment. Any transition should have a public timetable, reasons, legal review and an assessment of distributional effects. Additional support also has fiscal costs. Those costs should be stated and compared with observed household disruption, rather than presented as free reassurance.

Table 5 Proposed implementation agenda. Timetables are recommendations, not existing commitments or legal deadlines. Delivery would require administrative coordination and, where necessary, legislation or budget authority.

Priority	Responsible institutions proposed	First milestone	Outcome to evaluate
Public implementation record	Justice Ministry, court administration and implementing agencies	Initial register within 30 days of adoption	Due obligations completed; reasons and duration of unresolved cases
Effective civilian remedies	Responsible protection and enforcement bodies, with independent monitoring	Scoped review within 90 days	Sustained access restored; recurrence and reporting access
Fair obligations and household support	Knesset, finance and labor authorities, relevant civilian agencies	Joint review within six months	Payment timeliness, employment continuity and household disruption

Preserve care and essential civilian provision

Mental-health services should provide confidential treatment and continuity of care for affected personnel and families. Access should not depend on political conformity or public disclosure of a diagnosis. Waiting times, interrupted treatment and return to employment are relevant outcomes. The justification is welfare and functioning; the report makes no claim that treatment has been shown here to prevent political violence.

Fiscal adjustment should include a distributional assessment of essential services. The finance authorities and Knesset should make changes to service availability and quality visible alongside spending totals. Protecting every current program would be neither feasible nor necessarily effective. The relevant test is whether procurement, delivery and access sustain services that people need, with particular attention to those facing persistent income loss.

Independent journalism and civic organizations also help make official claims testable. Their value depends on access to information and the ability to document implementation. Dialogue can support that work when participants can influence decisions and follow their consequences. Meetings alone cannot substitute for protection or enforceable rights.

Limits and the conclusion supported by the evidence

The study's strongest evidence concerns published economic aggregates, observable legal events and documented civilian harm. Its weakest evidence concerns security-institution cohesion, the intentions of political actors and the causal effects of proposed prevention measures. These gaps constrain the forward judgments. They do not erase findings that rest on direct observations.

Source coverage is uneven. Several original court documents were located but could not be downloaded; reproduced texts and detailed reporting supplied part of the legal record. Hebrew material was interpreted through working translation. Arabic-language evidence is not represented through a comprehensive search. Humanitarian monitoring operates under access and verification constraints. Surveys differ in question wording, population and collection mode. A more complete study would require sustained collection and review beyond this single assessment.

The statistical additions improve transparency and reveal differences hidden by aggregate narratives. They cannot identify the effect of legal reform on conflict, the causes of every observed disparity, or an eighteen-month civil-war probability. The timing of available releases also varies. A current evidence cutoff does not make a May 2025 attitude survey a current measurement of October 2026 attitudes.

The evidence favors continued Israeli state functioning while leaving substantial concern about the quality and distribution of public authority. The most consequential unresolved question is whether legal correction reaches the people it is meant to protect. Institutions demonstrate resilience when binding decisions are implemented, opponents remain lawful participants and civilian remedies work in practice. Those outcomes can be assessed without waiting for a national collapse to establish that prevention was needed.

Appendix A Source selection and access

The expanded review searched official and academic sources for the following strands. This is a record of the work performed, not a claim to have conducted a systematic review or an exhaustive legal audit. Sources were consulted on 7 October 2026. Publication dates, event dates and fieldwork periods are recorded separately.

Search strand	Sources examined	Result and remaining limit
Economic capacity and household conditions	Bol releases and forecasts; IMF consultation; CBS release; IDI worker survey	Updated September reserves and compared published recovery paths; no household microdata analysis
Service burdens and attitudes	IDI reserve-service analysis and Democracy Index; JPPI report	Published inputs transcribed with population, fieldwork and measurement distinctions
Institutional decisions and implementation	Court locators and reproductions; President's Office; Knesset; LOC; court reporting	Added primary appointment confirmation, legislative records and conflicting enforcement follow-up
Civilian protection	OCHA monthly infographic and incident report; ICRC statement	Same-vintage matched-period comparison; reporting access and primary remedy text remain limits
External relationships	Enacted US appropriations; CRS; EEAS; EPRS; Commission proposal	Distinguished appropriations and adopted measures from proposals and future commitments
Explanatory and measurement research	Full accessible academic works on compliance and democratic measurement; original conflict references	Strengthened institutional framework without importing foreign effect sizes

The newer academic works by Vanberg, Little and Meng, and Knutsen and colleagues were consulted in full accessible versions. Graham and Svolik were consulted through a full author manuscript dated September 2019, with the 2020 publication identified. The original Fearon–Laitin, Cederman and colleagues, Ward and colleagues, and Nepstad references were retained at the abstract-level scope disclosed in the first version. Their use remains limited to those stated findings. Rotberg's chapter and the accessible text of the Israel Law Review article were also consulted. [4,5,6,7,14,30,44,45,46,47]

Indexed official text supported some Knesset, election-calendar and Library of Congress entries when direct retrieval failed. Original court-download links for the main cases returned errors. The register supplies case identifiers and cites clearly labeled reproduced judgments, distinguishing those texts from any automated summaries on the host. The underlying Justice Ministry enforcement memo was not obtained; the report preserves the disagreement between the reported memo and the later IDF statement.

The analysis does not treat reports copied from OCHA as independent corroboration. It uses a single September 2026 OCHA vintage for both years of the monthly comparison because later verification can revise older counts. The local source PDF was checked visually against the transcribed series. Its SHA-256 digest is recorded with the reproduction inputs.

Appendix B Quantitative inputs and reproduction

The following inputs are sufficient to reproduce every derived numerical comparison in the text and figures. Values are manually transcribed published aggregates. The script uses Python 3's standard library, prints

unrounded results and was executed during preparation. Figures round those outputs for readability. The chart code only formats the same values; it does not estimate additional quantities.

Table B1 Inputs for economic, burden and trust calculations. The September reserves vintage supplies the historical comparator as well as the latest level. GDP indices compare normalized annual output, not year-end or monthly GDP.

Input	Values in order	Source and definition
Reserves in US\$ million	Sep 2025 231880; Aug 2026 241641; Sep 2026 236998	September 2026 Bol release table [35]
Reported revaluation component	4411 US\$ million decline	Bol's approximate component, not a full accounting identity [35]
Bol GDP growth	2026 4.0%; 2027 5.5%	July 2026 projection [18]
IMF GDP growth	2026 3.5%; 2027 4.4%	July 2026 projection [19]
Religious reserve participation	2023 Q4 15.2%; 2025 4.3%	Average month, Jewish men 21–44 [21]
Traditional reserve participation	2023 Q4 11.2%; 2025 2.6%	Same definition [21]
Secular reserve participation	2023 Q4 11.2%; 2025 1.7%	Same definition [21]
IDF trust	May 2024 69%; May 2025 75%	Total sample, published rounded values [36,49]
Supreme Court trust	May 2024 37%; May 2025 41.5%	Same source and response grouping [36,49]
Police trust	May 2024 41%; May 2025 37%	Same source and response grouping [36,49]
Government trust	May 2024 18%; May 2025 22%	Same source and response grouping [36,49]

Table B2 Monthly inputs for the matched-period comparison. Source [37], published 23 September 2026. Attacks involve casualties or property damage; displacement is linked to settler attacks and related access restrictions, excluding other causes.

Month	Attacks 2025	Attacks 2026	Displaced 2025	Displaced 2026
January	139	148	16	701
February	117	194	219	645
March	110	207	7	408
April	127	214	49	248
May	142	212	130	155
June	135	229	283	151
July	166	221	258	162
August	140	198	250	146
Total	1076	1623	1212	2616

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The percentage change is the later value divided by the earlier value, minus one, multiplied by 100. A percentage-point change subtracts the two published percentages directly. The GDP path begins at 100 and

multiplies successively by one plus each annual growth rate divided by 100. The 2027 relative gap uses the IMF normalized value as its denominator. The valuation share divides the reported revaluation decline by the observed net reserve decline.

Measurement sensitivity

The attack-count ratio is 1.508. Assume consistent event definitions and geography, negligible false positives, and recorded counts equal to underlying incidents multiplied by the fraction ascertained. Under this simplified measurement model, the recorded ratio equals the underlying incident ratio multiplied by the change in ascertainment. An unchanged underlying incident level would therefore require ascertainment in 2026 to be about 50.8% higher than in 2025. This is a break-even calculation, not evidence that ascertainment actually changed by that amount. If ascertainment were hypothetically 20% higher, the adjusted incident increase would be 25.7%. The available data do not estimate this factor, so the exercise neither validates nor rules out a reporting-based explanation. It shows explicitly which unmeasured change would alter interpretation.

Executed reproduction code

```

"""Reproduce report arithmetic from the published inputs transcribed below.
Python 3 standard library. Percent inputs are in percentage units.
Sources: source numbers in the final Appendix B input table.
"""

from json import dumps
from pathlib import Path

reserves = {'Sep2025':231880,'Aug2026':241641,'Sep2026':236998}
revaluation_decline = 4411
rates = {'BoI':[4.0,5.5], 'IMF':[3.5,4.4]}
burden = {'Religious':[15.2,4.3], 'Traditional':[11.2,2.6],
          'Secular':[11.2,1.7]}
trust = {'IDF':[69,75], 'Supreme Court':[37,41.5],
         'Police':[41,37], 'Government':[18,22]}
attacks25 = [139,117,110,127,142,135,166,140]
attacks26 = [148,194,207,214,212,229,221,198]
displaced25 = [16,219,7,49,130,283,258,250]
displaced26 = [701,645,408,248,155,151,162,146]

def pct_change(old,new):
    return 100*(new/old-1)

def index_path(growth):
    values=[100.0]
    for g in growth:
        values.append(values[-1]*(1+g/100))
    return values

paths={k:index_path(v) for k,v in rates.items()}
net_decline=reserves['Aug2026']-reserves['Sep2026']
results={
    'reserves_monthly_pct':pct_change(reserves['Aug2026'],reserves['Sep2026']),
    'reserves_annual_pct':pct_change(reserves['Sep2025'],reserves['Sep2026']),
    'valuation_share_net_decline_pct':100*revaluation_decline/net_decline,
    'gdp_paths':paths,
    'gdp_2027_index_gap':paths['BoI'][-1]-paths['IMF'][-1],
    'gdp_2027_relative_gap_pct':pct_change(paths['IMF'][-1],paths['BoI'][-1]),
    'burden_change_pct':{k:pct_change(*v) for k,v in burden.items()},
    'religious_secular_ratio':[burden['Religious'][i]/burden['Secular'][i] for i in [0,1]],
    'religious_secular_gap_pp':[burden['Religious'][i]-burden['Secular'][i] for i in [0,1]],
    'trust_changes_pp':{k:v[1]-v[0] for k,v in trust.items()},
    'attacks_totals':[sum(attacks25),sum(attacks26)],
    'attacks_change_pct':pct_change(sum(attacks25),sum(attacks26)),
    'attack_ratio':sum(attacks26)/sum(attacks25),
    'attacks_adjusted_if_capture_up20_pct':100*((sum(attacks26)/sum(attacks25))/1.2-1),
    'displaced_totals':[sum(displaced25),sum(displaced26)],
    'displaced_janmar':[sum(displaced25[3:]),sum(displaced26[3:])],
    'displaced_apraug':[sum(displaced25[3:]),sum(displaced26[3:])],
    'displaced_apraug_pct':pct_change(sum(displaced25[3:]),sum(displaced26[3:])),

```

```

'attacks_apraug_pct':pct_change(sum(attacks25[3:]),sum(attacks26[3:])),
'displaced_change_pct':pct_change(sum(displaced25),sum(displaced26)),
}
assert results['attacks_totals']==[1076,1623]
assert results['displaced_totals']==[1212,2616]
assert round(paths['BoI'][-1],3)==109.720
assert round(paths['IMF'][-1],3)==108.054
print(dumps(results,indent=2))

```

Research assistance

AI tools assisted source discovery, drafting and code preparation. Reported calculations were executed, and factual claims were checked against the cited materials within the access limits described above.

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